Ccncentraticn ofwealth increases as well. T heG ini coeî dentgpes from
0.263 to 0.367. This is due to the factthatthe majority ofthe population
is trapped in a low level of wealth, which does not allow them to under-
take human capitalinvestment. Only fewdynasties (16.26%) can getoutof
non-cuaii...caticn and poverty and gp up the income and éducation ladder
accumulatingmore wealth and increasingconcentration.
As forscenarioII, we obtain the followingdynamics: cuali.ed dynasties
remain in thesame educationaland occupationalcategories oftheirprogen-
itors. D escendants from non-cuali.ed entrepreneurs accumulate wealth and
undertakehuman capitalinvestment, becoming, in thelong-run, cuali.eden-
treɔreneurs. Someofthecescendartsfτomnor-cμa∣li..edworkers((°eq ∣ °enq)
share ofthe non-cuali.ed population, thatis 18% ofthe whole population)
become cuali.ed workers, the others become cuali.ed entrepreneurs. A ctu-
ally all the non-cu∣alι...ed workers may aPord education in the lone- run but
some ofthem are suΦ dently eî dent to .nd it ɔro,,tabe to become entre
preneurs when cuali.ed. In thelone-run the whole population is cuali.ed.
T able 4 summarizes occupationaldistribution in this case.
|
N Q |
Q |
mare. distr. | ||||
|
W |
0:3833 |
0 |
0:20475 ! |
0:4095 |
0:58805 ! |
0:4095 |
|
E ^ |
0 :1166 |
0 |
0:29525 ! |
0:5905 |
0:41185 ! |
0:5905 |
|
mare. distr. |
0:5 ! |
0 |
0:5 ! |
1 |
_____________1____________ | |
|
G IN I = |
0:263 ! |
0:25 | ||||
T able 4: evolution of the occupationaldistribution in scenario II (proeenitors !long-run) .
R elatively to scenario I, the reduction ofthe cost ofeducation has im-
pliedthepossibiiity, fcrallthe dynasties, tobecome educated. A nyway h
represents human capitalitself, and its reduction implies also a loweraccu-
mulation ofwealth foreducated people. A ctually, in this scenario, cuali.ed
workersconvereeto 1:80 5 . T hesetofsteadystates forcuali.edentrepreneurs
is instead (1:805;7:914] , while itwas (2:2 5;9:83] in scenarioI.
L one- run distribution ofwealth is sketched in.eure2-4 (II). In this case,
the possibility forthe entire population to become educated determines an
increase in the mean wealth (3:6) and a decrease in the concentration (G ini
coeî dent becomes 0.25).
Summineup, we can state the followine:
2 when the transmission of technical ine¢ dency is genetic there may
existmultiple equilibria. The higher the liquidity constrained share of
18
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