20
Table 4: Policy variables and relative prices
|
Model without Feedback |
Model with Feedback | |||||||
|
CO2 |
Reduction |
Real |
Terms of |
CO2 |
Reduction |
Real |
Terms of | |
|
(ECU95/ |
% change in 2010 w.r.t. baseline |
(ECU95/ |
% change in 2010 w.r.t. baseline | |||||
|
Austria |
147.5 |
5.79 |
1.71 |
0.58 |
149.5 |
5.93 |
1.78 |
0.59 |
|
Belgium |
24.1 |
2.09 |
1.18 |
0.23 |
24.3 |
2.24 |
1.27 |
0.22 |
|
Germany |
9Γ |
0.63 |
0.35 |
0.30 |
10.6 |
0.78 |
0.44 |
0.29 |
|
Denmark |
64.2 |
3.24 |
1.38 |
0.46 |
64.6 |
3.30 |
1.42 |
0.46 |
|
Finland |
L7^ |
0.11 |
0.25 |
0.11 |
17 |
0.12 |
0.26 |
0.12 |
|
France |
40.0 |
1.88 |
0.93 |
0.00 |
37.8 |
1.81 |
0.93 |
0.00 |
|
Greece |
4.7 |
1.29 |
1.03 |
0.33 |
4^9^ |
1.35 |
1.08 |
0.35 |
|
Ireland |
46.5 |
4.37 |
L95^ |
0.18 |
46.1 |
4.36 |
1.95- |
0.18 |
|
Italy |
166.1 |
11.70 |
5.66 |
0.70 |
166.1 |
11.81 |
5.73 |
0.69 |
|
The Netherlands |
28.2 |
2.13 |
1.08 |
-0.03 |
27.0 |
2.19 |
∏4^ |
-0.04 |
|
Portugal |
13.3 |
1.76 |
ΓT9^^ |
0.08 |
12.8 |
1.82 |
1.25 |
0.07 |
|
Spain |
60.1 |
5.16 |
2.32 |
0.98 |
59.4 |
5.16 |
2.34 |
0.97 |
|
Sweden |
79^ |
0.40 |
0.33 |
0.04 |
8.Ô" |
0.41 |
0.35 |
0.05 |
|
^UK |
12~ |
0.06 |
0.47 |
0.32 |
Ï.5" |
0.11 |
0.52 |
0.34 |
|
"EU |
37.3 |
2.99 |
∏4^ |
1.78 |
40.2 |
3.06 |
1.20 |
1.79 |
Table 4 also presents the terms of trade effect. Previous research indicates that
this is an important element in the explanation of the double dividend that can be
realised by CO2 taxes in the EU (see, for example, de Mooij (1999) and Proost and Van
Regemorter (1998)). However, in our exercise it does not play a major role in
explaining the difference in impacts between the two models, as the terms of trade
effect hardly changes between the two versions of the GEM-E3 model.
Table 5 summarizes the impact of the domestic CO2 taxes on the emissions of
NOx, SO2, VOC and PM at the EU level. The difference between the two models is the
result of the different CO2 reduction targets that are imposed.
For the individual countries the terms of trade are computed relative to all trading partners, whereas for
the EU as a whole the terms of trade are computed relative to outside EU trading partners.
More intriguing information
1. Why unwinding preferences is not the same as liberalisation: the case of sugar2. Optimal Tax Policy when Firms are Internationally Mobile
3. APPLICATIONS OF DUALITY THEORY TO AGRICULTURE
4. Behaviour-based Knowledge Systems: An Epigenetic Path from Behaviour to Knowledge
5. The Economic Value of Basin Protection to Improve the Quality and Reliability of Potable Water Supply: Some Evidence from Ecuador
6. Second Order Filter Distribution Approximations for Financial Time Series with Extreme Outlier
7. An Attempt to 2
8. Evidence of coevolution in multi-objective evolutionary algorithms
9. Spatial patterns in intermunicipal Danish commuting
10. The name is absent