The name is absent



also be partially ordered by the responsiveness of the aggregate tax liability with respect
to income. Indeed, let
Z = in=1 (xi + yi) be the pre-tax aggregate total income and
R = in=1 (L(xi) + K(yi)) the aggregate total tax liability. If Z changes only due to equipro-
portionate changes in
x and y 10, R can be viewed as function of Z.11 Suppose that, at some
initial point,
Z = Z0. Then, R = R(kZ) with R(Z) = R0 = R(Z0).

The average-rate responsiveness and the elasticity of the aggregate total tax liability with
respect to the aggregate total income are defined respectively as

(14)


R(Z)Z - R(Z)


(Φ)'


(15)


E(Z) =


R'(Z )Z

RZ.


Next, we obtain the following result, that is proved in the appendix12.

Lemma 1 Let x = (x1,...,xn) and y = (y1,...,yn) be the labor and capital income distri-
butions respectively of a (finite) set of tax-payers and T
(x, y) = L(x) + K(y) is the current
quasi-progressive dual tax schedule. Then,

A(Z) =


n=1 (βL( x2 + βK(yi) У2}
Z 2

E(Z) = 1 +


n=1 (βL(χi) x2 + βK(yi) Vi}
n=ι T (χi,yi)

Hence, we are in a position to extend Pfahler’s result (1984).

Proposition 3 Let x = (x1,...,xn) and y = (y1,...,yn) be the labor and capital income
distributions respectively of a (finite) set of tax-payers. Let also T
(, ) be a quasi-progressive
dual tax schedule and
(γ,^) R+. Then, Γ(γ, φ,T, x, y) is a lattice endowed with a partial
order
^ defined by the elasticity E(Z) of the aggregate total tax liability and the supremum
and infimum operators
, are defined in (11).

10 r = (r1,...,rn) is obtained from a equiproportionate change of s' = (s1,..., sn) if ri = ksi for all i = 1,..., n.
11 Hutton and Lambert (1979) make the same assumption.

12The proof, although similar to Hutton and Lambert (1979), is made for discrete distributions.

16



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