COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR MARKET GAMES:
THE STRONG CONCAVITY CASE
Luis C. Corchon
ABSTRACT
In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable
(the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the
strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash Equilibrium in the framework
of a Market Game (a generalization of the Cournot model). We assume a strong
concavity condition which implies that the best reply function of any player
is decreasing on sum of the strategies of the remaining players (i.e.
strategic substitution). Our results generalize and unify those known in the
Cournot model.
More intriguing information
1. Conservation Payments, Liquidity Constraints and Off-Farm Labor: Impact of the Grain for Green Program on Rural Households in China2. Experience, Innovation and Productivity - Empirical Evidence from Italy's Slowdown
3. Dendritic Inhibition Enhances Neural Coding Properties
4. The name is absent
5. Spectral calibration of exponential Lévy Models [1]
6. Climate change, mitigation and adaptation: the case of the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia
7. Return Predictability and Stock Market Crashes in a Simple Rational Expectations Model
8. Ventas callejeras y espacio público: efectos sobre el comercio de Bogotá
9. Public-Private Partnerships in Urban Development in the United States
10. Does Market Concentration Promote or Reduce New Product Introductions? Evidence from US Food Industry