COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR MARKET GAMES:
THE STRONG CONCAVITY CASE
Luis C. Corchon
ABSTRACT
In this paper we study the effects of a change in some exogenous variable
(the number of players or a parameter in the payoff functions) on the
strategies played and payoffs obtained in a Nash Equilibrium in the framework
of a Market Game (a generalization of the Cournot model). We assume a strong
concavity condition which implies that the best reply function of any player
is decreasing on sum of the strategies of the remaining players (i.e.
strategic substitution). Our results generalize and unify those known in the
Cournot model.
More intriguing information
1. Licensing Schemes in Endogenous Entry2. Accurate and robust image superresolution by neural processing of local image representations
3. Competition In or For the Field: Which is Better
4. Modelling Transport in an Interregional General Equilibrium Model with Externalities
5. A Computational Model of Children's Semantic Memory
6. Strategic monetary policy in a monetary union with non-atomistic wage setters
7. The duration of fixed exchange rate regimes
8. Global Excess Liquidity and House Prices - A VAR Analysis for OECD Countries
9. The problem of anglophone squint
10. The name is absent