Proof By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006), τ = γ. Hence, Oτ (P, k) = Oγ(P, k). By
Lemma 1 of Kesten (2006), f is Ergin-acyclic. So, from Theorem 6.5, S(P) = Oγ (P, k) =
Oτ (P,k). ■
Proof of Theorem 6.8 Follows from Lemmas B.10 and B.11.
Lemma B.12 Let the priority structure f admit an X-cycle. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then,
there is a school choice problem P with a Pareto inefficient equilibrium outcome in the
game Γτ(P, k), i.e., for some Q ∈ Eτ(P, k), τ(Q) ∈ PE(P).
Proof Since f admits an X -cycle, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
(a) fs1(ij) < fs1(i1) < fs1(i2) for each j ∈ I1 := {3, . . . , qs1 + 1} and
(b) fs2(ij) < fs2(i2) < fs2(i1) for each j ∈ I2 := {qs1 + 2, . . . ,qs1 + qs2}.
Consider students’ preferences P defined by Pi1 := s2, s1, Pi2 := s1, s2, Pij := s1 for
j ∈ I1, Pij := S2 for j ∈ I2, and Pij := 0 for all j ∈ ⅛1 + qs2 + 1,. .., n}.
Consider Q ∈ Q(k)I defined by Qi1 := s1, Qi2 := s2, and Qi := Pi for all i ∈ I \{i1 , i2}.
One easily verifies that at τ(Q) all students in {i3, i4, . . . , iqs1 +qs2 } are assigned to their
favorite school. Also, τ(Q)(i1) = s1 and τ (Q)(i2) = s2. It is obvious that at τ(Q)
students i1 and i2 would like to swap their seats, i.e., τ (Q) ∈ PE(P). Nevertheless, there
is no unilateral deviation for either of the two students to obtain the other seat. Hence,
Q ∈Eτ(P,k). ■
Proposition B.13 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If for some school choice problem P there exists
Q ∈ Eτ (P, k) such that τ (Q) ∈/ PE(P) then f admits an X -cycle.
Proof Let Q ∈ Eτ(P, k) be such that τ(Q) ∈/ PE(P). In view of Proposition B.9 we may
assume without loss of generality that k = 1 and for each student i ∈ I, Qi = τ (Q)(i).
For any school s ∈ S and any profile Q ∈ QI, let As(Q) be the set of students to which
school s points whenever school s is part of a cycle, i.e.,
As(Q) := {i ∈ I : there is a step l of TTC(Q) with i = e(Q, l, s) and s ∈ F(Q, l, i)} .
Step 1 There exist p ≥ 2, a set of students CI = {i1 , . . . , ip}, and a set of schools
CS = {s1, . . . , sp} such that
(a) for each student ir ∈ CI, srPir sr+1 = τ (Q)(ir) (where ip+1 = i0),
(b) for each school s ∈ CS, ∣As(Q)∣ = ∣τ(Q)(s)∣ = qs, and
(c) for any two distinct schools s, s' ∈ Cs, As(Q) ∩ As'(Q) = 0.
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