Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources



N

where c(xi) 2.5xi is the cost of the effort, X =x is the group effort, and f (X) is the group
i

1

revenue. Group revenues are shared according to the relative effort — of each individual.

X

The function f(X) is continuous in R+, increasing in X[0, 92], decreasing for X>92, and with

a lower bound at -200:

1  — X - -1 X2,

f ( x M 2    16 .   .

200 [ e -00575( x-184)


-1],


ifX184

ifX184


(2)


From the first-order conditions to maximize earnings —i- = 0, one can derive the best
xi

response functions xi * = 72 - 2 X - i, where X- i


N

= xj . The Nash equilibrium is unique and
ji


symmetric and leads to an aggregate outcome of X*=128 and an individual outcome of xi=16
i. Group profits at the Nash equilibrium are just 39.5% of the potential profits (128/324).
This result is standard in the renewable resource literature (Clark, 1990).

Common-pool resource appropriation is very similar to a Cournot oligopoly when xi is
interpreted as the quantity produced and
f(X) as the aggregate market profits. As in the
adopted design the users of the resource are more than two, a richer set of individual
behaviors may be generated. Such individual behavior has been reported in detail in Casari
and Plott (2003).

Four sessions of 32 periods were run. Agents face the same incentive structure for the
length of a session. No communication was allowed among subjects and at the end of each
period they could observe the aggregate outcome but not the individual choices of others.
The experimental results are summarized below in three points relating to aggregate resource
use, variability in aggregate resource use, and individual heterogeneity, respectively:



More intriguing information

1. A Study of Prospective Ophthalmology Residents’ Career Perceptions
2. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE
3. Commuting in multinodal urban systems: An empirical comparison of three alternative models
4. Experimental Evidence of Risk Aversion in Consumer Markets: The Case of Beef Tenderness
5. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN HEALTH INSURANCE- THE IRISH CASE STUDY.
6. Developments and Development Directions of Electronic Trade Platforms in US and European Agri-Food Markets: Impact on Sector Organization
7. The name is absent
8. FDI Implications of Recent European Court of Justice Decision on Corporation Tax Matters
9. Top-Down Mass Analysis of Protein Tyrosine Nitration: Comparison of Electron Capture Dissociation with “Slow-Heating” Tandem Mass Spectrometry Methods
10. The name is absent
11. Response speeds of direct and securitized real estate to shocks in the fundamentals
12. BODY LANGUAGE IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN LARGE GROUPS
13. O funcionalismo de Sellars: uma pesquisa histδrica
14. CREDIT SCORING, LOAN PRICING, AND FARM BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
15. Achieving the MDGs – A Note
16. Mergers under endogenous minimum quality standard: a note
17. On Evolution of God-Seeking Mind
18. BARRIERS TO EFFICIENCY AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF TOWNSHIP-VILLAGE ENTERPRISES
19. LAND-USE EVALUATION OF KOCAELI UNIVERSITY MAIN CAMPUS AREA
20. Learning-by-Exporting? Firm-Level Evidence for UK Manufacturing and Services Sectors