Figure 4: Average Concave and Convex Bid Functions in LOW and MIX
In the symmetric setting, the submission of concave bid functions may be consistent with the
CRRA model of Cox et al. (1988), which assumes heterogeneity in the bidders’ risk attitudes.
In that model, bidder i’s utility function is defined as (vi - b)ri , with ri i.i.d. according to
G : [0, rmax] and where rmax stands for the coefficient of the less risk averse bidder. If
valuations are uniformly drawn, the CRRA equilibrium strategies are linear and can be
determined only up to a maximum bid b , which is itself determined by the number of bidders
match the concave (convex) shape of EBR functions so that we did not report them.
24
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