evident in a symmetric environment than in the asymmetric environments that we considered.
Although the received Nash equilibrium models are well supported only in the aggregate, our
analysis of the asymmetric bidding environments indicates that the low-balling predictions of
Maskin and Riley (2000a) are remarkably robust to the out-of-equilibrium behavior of Weak
bidders. To this extent, we can conjecture that a necessary condition to observe the revenue
implications of bidders’ asymmetric preferences is that Strong bidders do indeed low-ball as
expected.
29
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