Cooperative Bargaining and
Collective Models
In cooperative bargaining models or collective models of
the household, individual household members are assumed
to have different preferences, but resources are pooled and
individuals bargain over how to allocate them. The
outcomes of decisions made within the household will be
affected by the bargaining power of individual household
members. Any factor that affects an individual’s utility
outside of the household will affect his or her bargaining
power within the household, including individual income,
access to land and other resources, kinship networks, and
other legal and social structures.11 Evidence from numerous
locations supports this model. In particular, numerous
studies suggest that women’s access to land and other
resources from sources outside of the household affects
their access to resources within the household (Siandwazi
et al. 1991). In Ghana, the distribution of asset ownership
within the household affects health and education
outcomes (Doss 1997). In Cameroon, Koopman (1991)
finds that the terms on which women farmers gain access
to credit, labor, or land not owned by their husbands,
affects their bargaining power regarding decisions about
household resources. The amount of land that women
receive from their kin may affect the levels of independence
enjoyed by different wives of the same husband (Bryson
1981). The exchange of labor and resources within the
household is finely balanced. Staudt (1987) notes that
when the “terms of trade” become too unfavorable to
women, they may choose to leave their husbands.
There is substantial evidence that men and women
choose to spend the money under their control differently
(Hoddinott 1993; Zuidberg 1994; Doss 1997).12
Household expenditures are often a matter of negotiation
and conflict. In Zambia, Geisler (1992) reports that wives
often try to insist that the crop should be bartered for
clothing and other household items. In addition, conflicts
may arise regarding how much of the produce to sell,
especially if women are more concerned with retaining
adequate food supplies while men are more interested in
obtaining cash to purchase other goods (Holmboe-Ottesen
and Wandel 1991). Thus, policies or technologies that
affect which person earns and controls income may affect
the outcomes of household decisions.
In terms of agricultural productivity, these models
suggest that if men and women have different preferences
regarding labor allocation, agricultural production, or
consumption, the bargaining power of individuals will
affect the outcomes of decisions. In particular, men and
women may have different preferences over which crops to
produce and the levels of inputs to use. Therefore, when
comparing households that have the same household
structure and level of endowments, we might find different
outcomes if the allocation of endowments among
household members differs.
Noncooperative Bargaining Models
The second category of models, often referred to as
noncooperative bargaining models, suggests that resources
within the household are not pooled. In these models,
individuals within the household make separate decisions.
Individuals retain control over their own resources,
including labor, and independently make allocation
decisions. Obviously, these decisions are conditioned on
the relationships within the household, in particular the
“conjugal contract” or the expectations about the
contributions that men and women will make to the
household. For example, men may have the ability to
requisition women’s labor for some activities without
compensation, whereas for other activities, women must be
compensated. The conjugal contract determines the terms
of trade among household members.
One result that is consistent with these models is that
outcomes may not be Pareto efficient. In other words,
changes in the allocation of resources could result in a
situation in which at least one household member is made
better off, without making anyone else in the household
11 There has been an effort within the literature to show that exogenous measures of bargaining power affect household decision-making. Many of the
measures of bargaining power that are discussed here, including incomes, access to land and other resources, and kinship ties are endogenous to the
household, especially when marriage markets and household formation are treated as endogenous.
12 These examples are all from Africa, however, similar evidence is available from other areas of the world. Some examples are cited in Doss (1996).
19