the bargaining effort is logically influenced by the
environment in which the negotiations are conducted.
Some farmer organizations have made substantial
gains from bargaining, as noted in the example of the
dairy industry. Admittedly, such factors as the long
history of cooperative action in the dairy industry,
the downward trend in milk production during the
early years of the movement (which was offset to
some extent by reductions in consumption), the
existence of government assistance through a system
of federal (milk) orders and the price support
program were instrumental in improving the potential
for success. However, given the adverse factors
surrounding this experiment such as the wide
geographic distribution of producers, the history of
open warfare among principals over markets, wide
differences in managerial philosophy among managers
of potential joining organizations, the violent reaction
in opposition to the movement by vested interests
both within and outside the industry, etc., caused
most observers to give this venture almost no chance
of success.
A PLEA FOR EDUCATION AND LEADERSHIP
One is again reminded of the parallel of
Machiavelli’s observations-“the reformer has enemies
in all those who profit by the old order, and only
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by
the new order,,-to the prevailing attitudes toward
producer bargaining. Formidable and persistent
opposition has continued to accompany efforts to
develop and/or maintain bargaining power in
agriculture. Much of this opposition seems to arise
from those who stand to gain from maintaining the
status quo. This is reasonable to expect. However,
this tendency has drawn sharp criticism from
numerous agricultural leaders. For example, Claude
W. Gifford, Economics Editor, Farm Journal (and
now Director of Information, USDA), in addressing
the Fifteenth National Conference of Bargaining
Cooperatives in Washington, D.C., in January, 1971
said:
“There will be some increasingly
‘hard sell’ against farm bargaining as
you do become more effective.
There are people around working
against you, as you well
know-processors and handlers,
naturally. But there will be others,
too.”
He went on to say, “skeptics say it
won’t work. Some politicians who
represent consumers primarily.
People employed in government
programs who believe that only
government can do the job.
Planners who believe that the
public, through government should
determine more of the nation’s
production and prices. Those who
are afraid of farmers getting too
much power over prices.”
This is not to say that opposition should be
stilled or even be discouraged. In fact, opposition to
the development of bargaining power by farmers or
any other group may be defensible from the
standpoint of efforts to preserve the competitive
aspect of the market. To say the least, this is a
reasonable proposition for debate by economists.
However, convictions that the development of
bargaining power should be discouraged is not, in my
opinion, a legitimate justification for negativism with
respect to the possibility of developing bargaining
power. Too, it seems that as social scientists and
educators, we have a prime responsibility for assessing
the equity considerations implicit in the progressive
reordering of agriculture. Padberg [14] in addressing
this issue commented-ςTf technology continues to
enter agriculture, challenging institutions and
upsetting power balances, and if balance-redressing
organizations are seen as needed, what assistance can
be given? ... In the case Ofbargaining in agriculture,
the question becomes one of how to help develop
new institutions for agricultural marketing and
pricing. Educators have a vital role.”
Some articles written on the subject of
bargaining power appear to be extreme in that they
are directed toward refuting obviously questionable
objectives of bargaining. For example, one finds
reference to the uncontested point that the
development of bargaining or market power cannot
be expected to cure all of the ills of agriculture.
Others seem to imply (perhaps unintentionally) that
significant gains from bargaining result only when
most, if not all, requirements are met for attaining
maximum market power. This is not to suggest that
all extreme statements are of a negative nature.
Exaggerated claims of potential benefits to be derived
by farmers from establishing and using bargaining
power are also often found. It would appear,
however, that the balance of expressed opinion on
this subject is decidedly in a negative vein. This seems
to be especially true of much of the writings of
academic agricultural economists. This is not to imply
a lack of objectivity nor technical competence among
those who embrace these views. In most cases, the
vahdity of the economic rationale advanced by these
writers in support of their conclusions meet the most
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