West idea as originally formulated by Kohn as he grouped the German-speaking
countries firmly in the ethnic category. Instead, the fault line in the Eurobarometer
data appears to run along the former Iron Curtain, the former communist states all
expressing stronger support for the ethnic dimension vis-a-vis the political
dimension than the traditional capitalist states of the West (Greece being the only
exception). Related to this issue is the comparatively low level of support by the
former communist countries for the political dimension. This is not so surprising as
it might appear at first glance if one reconsiders the items of which this dimension
is composed. As was the case with Hjerm’s political dimension of national pride,
two of these concern the national economy and the social security system. Thus,
one could again argue that in view of the modest level of real incomes and social
services in former communist countries in relation to Western countries it is quite
logical to find only lukewarm support for these items in Hungary and the Czech
Republic (see Appendix 2).
This conjecture in turn raises a number of interesting questions. For instance,
have West Germany and Austria always shown such high levels of support for the
political dimension in relation to the ethnic dimension? If so, then Kohn was wrong
to assume that an ethnic conception of nationhood prevailed in the German-
speaking countries at the turn of the century (at least as far as mass attitudes on
national identity are concerned). If not, then Austrians and West-Germans must
have moved away from a mainly ethnic to a predominantly political view of the
nation, a shift that might well be related to the post-war success of these countries
in developing a strong economy, a generous welfare system and a stable democracy.
If it can be proven that such a process has indeed occurred, then might we not
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