affiliations to really matter for attitudes on immigrants and feelings of closeness to
Jews and Gypsies. Remarkably, this applied to both symbolic resources (ethnic,
cultural and political markers) and boundary mechanisms (voluntary vs ascriptive
notions of nationhood). In other words, for their opinions on immigrants and other
nationalities, it was irrelevant whether respondents cast their national identities in
ethnic or political terms, in an inclusive or excluding manner. What did matter was
the level of importance assigned to the identity markers, i.e. the intensity of
national identifications. The higher this level, the more negative the perceptions on
immigrants. Thus it is not the kind of national identity but its strength that makes
the difference. In line with this argument, it is imaginable that people with more
tolerant views on immigrants have more mixed feelings about national identity in
general, predisposing them to give only half-hearted support to all markers
associated with nationhood. In other words, national identity and nationalism may
be considered improper and unfortunate phenomena altogether by this group of
people.
One final reservation has to be stated that might provide some solace to those
convinced of the connection between ethnic/ascribed identifications and
xenophobia. Respondents of both surveys most likely were not aware of the
consequences of each identity marker for membership of the nation when they
filled out the questionnaire. Had they been informed beforehand of the implications
of each item for accessibility to the nation and of the classifications and judgements
that invisible academics analysing their responses would make afterwards, they
might have shown a different pattern of responses.
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