17
Table 2 - The fundamental determinants of the intensity of capital controls in the EU
(i-iEuro)i,t.i |
DEPi |
INFi |
M2i |
DEFi |
DEBTi |
UNi |
CAi |
INF TAXi |
SEIGNi |
M2Mli |
CREDITi |
OPENi |
PRODi |
F |
R2 | |||
A |
_ See |
-0.022 (0.017) |
-0.205 (0.082) |
0.003 (0.023) |
-0.114* (0.060) |
0.008 (0.013) |
-0.001 (0.072)________ |
0.168* (0.073) |
0.708 (0.554) |
-0.210 (0.414) |
0.584** (0.226) |
-0.036 (0.021) |
-0.033 (0.025) |
0.092** (0.031) |
2.58 |
9.93 |
0.35 | |
B |
See |
-0.151" (0.050) |
-0.098* (0.048) |
0.150* (0.065) |
0.487* (0.211) |
-0.035** (0.011) |
0.097** (0.024) |
2.57 |
20.42 |
0.35 | ||||||||
C |
See |
0.548** (0.055) |
2.66 |
105.25 |
0.33 | |||||||||||||
D |
See |
0.324" (0.063) |
-0.019 (0.016) |
-0.124 (0.079) |
0.0008 (0.022) |
-0.130* (0.048) |
0.005 (0.056) |
-0.0005 (0.068) |
0.086 |
0.400 |
-0.096 (0.390) |
0.465* (0.214) |
-0.020 (0.020) |
-0.033 (0.024) |
0.059* (0.030) |
2.28 |
12.41 |
0.43 |
E |
See |
0.397" (0.059) |
-0.153" (0.032) |
-0.103* (0.043) |
2.31 |
52.04 |
0.41 |
ʌ: ζi___________________________________________ |
B: ζi_______________________________________________________ |
c-∙ ζi_______________________________________________________________ |
P: ζi_____________________________________________ |
E: ζi | ||||||
1 |
Netherlands |
-4.533 (3.427) |
Germany |
-6.482 (2.042)" |
Denmark |
0.483 (0.366) |
Netherlands |
-2.396 (3.249) |
Denmark |
1.399 (0.429)" |
2 |
Germany |
-4.931 (2.566) |
Spain |
-7.192 (2.249)" |
Austria |
0.147 (0.366) |
Belgium |
-2.505 (3.497) |
UK |
0.776 (0.469) |
3 |
Denmark |
-5.030 (3.245) |
Denmark |
-7.205 (2.327)" |
Netherlands |
0.004 (0.365) |
Denmark |
-2.689 (3.085) |
Spain |
0.686 (0.507) |
4 |
Belgium |
-5.121 (3.679)_____________ |
UK_______ |
-7.254 (2.233)"______________ |
Germany |
-0.080 (0.366)________________ |
Germany |
-3.292 (2.434)_______________ |
Austria |
0.628 (0.398)____________ |
5 |
Austria |
-6.045 (3.203) |
Netherlands |
-7.470 (2.140)" |
UK |
-0.157 (0.367) |
UK |
-3.791 (2.757) |
Germany |
0.272 (0.385) |
6 |
UK |
-6.192 (2.890)* |
Austria |
-7.861 (2.276)" |
Spain |
-0.336 (0.381) |
Austria |
-3.824 (3.043) |
Finland |
0.240 (0.407) |
7 |
Spain |
-6.370 (2.987)* |
France |
-7.873 (2.174)" |
Belgium |
-0.349 (0.366) |
Spain |
-4.103 (2.843) |
Netherlands |
0.239 (0.408) |
8 |
France |
-6.455 (2.817)*____________ |
Italy |
-8.645 (2.345)"______________ |
France |
-0.610 (0.373)________________ |
France |
-4.149 (2.686)_______________ |
Sweden |
0.100 (0.416)____________ |
9 |
Sweden |
-7.738 (3.081)* |
Belgium |
-8.714 (2.203)" |
Italy |
-0.659 (0.418) |
Sweden |
-4.778 (2.954) |
France |
0.051 (0.414) |
10 |
Italy |
-7.968 (3.042)* |
Sweden |
-9.560 (2.346)" |
Sweden |
-0.684 (0.380) |
Finland |
-5.208 (3.088) |
Belgium |
-0.422 (0.524) |
11 |
Finland |
-8.456 (3.214)" |
Finland |
-10.388 (2.456)** |
Finland |
-0.871 (0.382)* |
Italy |
-5.503 (2.900) |
Italy |
-0.543 (0.690) |
σ∣ is the variance of the error terms in the model, F is the F-test of the explanatory power of the regression and R2 is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, denoting the explanatory power of the regression. For critical
values of the t- and the F-distribution, see Dougherty (1992, pp. 364-371).
Significantly different from zero at the 95 % level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Significantly different from zero at the 99 % level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Source: see Appendix B.
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