The ultimate determinants of central bank independence



26

APPENDIX B. DERIVATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE FUNCTION F(ε) IN
THE FIRST-ORDER CONDITION.

F

(1) Demonstrationthat _ < 0.

∂ε

The first derivative of F with respect to ε is given by

∂F = -3U2 χ[(1 +g)(1 )2 + χ]2

(B.1)


d≈         σμ(1 -β )4(1+e)4

which is negative.

2F

(2) Demonstration that υ > 0.

∂ε2

The second derivative fo F with respect to ε is given by

2F =   6U2χΓ[Γ-χ]

(B.2)


2     (1 -β )4(1+ε)5 σ2μ

where Γ ≡ (1+ε)(1-β)2 + 2χ, (B.2) is positive.

(3) Demonstration that F(0) = [(1 ~ β) ] u .

(1 -β )4

This can be shown by direct examination of the right-hand side of equation (3.8) at ε = 0.

(4) Demonstration that u (1 β ) < F(ε) < [(1 β ) ] u
σμ                   (1 -β )4 σμ

Since F(0) = [(1 β) + χ] u ,
σ2μ(1 -β )4

lim = -u(1 β ) and dF < 0, F(ε) must be bounded between
e-∞        σ2          ∂ε

μ

u (1 β ) and F(0).
σ2μ

F

(5) Demonstration that > 0.

U

The first derivative of F with respect to U is given by



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