Therefore:
* (nɪ + n - 1)
(27)
⇒ τ =--------
a*
is the constant tax that will achieve the Pareto-optimal amount of phosphorous
loading when each community acts to maximize its welfare in a non-cooperative
way.
3.7 Private Equilibrium with Tax
To determine the impact of the tax on the non-cooperative phosphorous loading
in steady state and on the state of the lake, λ(t), λi(t) and λj∙(t) is substituted
into the steady-state tax equation. Therefore substituting (14), (24) and (25)
back into (23) one obtains:
-(nɪ + n )α(t)
α2(t)
1 n1 2x(t)
2---------Г I 2cix(t) + λi(t) b + p — ------------2 I
(nɪ + П2) ЁЛ L (x2(t) + 1)2J√
+ g 2cCx x(t) + λj (t) b + P — 2 2/,ʌ(,) -, x2 λ)
j=Λ L (x2(t) + 1) ∖)
. ./,ʌ 2 /,ʌ 2/,λ(n1c1 + n2c2)
⇒ a(t) = -Cx(t)α (t)---------
(nɪ + n2)2
a2(t) Γ, Cx(t) ↑ n n^ ʌ ^2 z Λ z ʌ
— 2-------πr b + P--λ g λi(t) + g λj(t) (C8)
(nɪ + n2)2[ (χ2(t) + i)2J y⅛ iu j=i jɪ !
From (C0)
λi(t) =τ - oi(tyand λj(t) =τ - aj⅛t (C9)
By substituting into (C8) one obtains:
a(t) = -Cx(t)a2(i)(nιc1 + n2,c2>
(nɪ + n2)2
- √a2(i⅛ [b+P —Cx':/I 2
(nɪ + n2)2 (x2(t) + 1)2
⇒ <j∙(t) = -Cx(t)tt⅜)(nn1+^>
- Γja2(t⅛ [b+P - Cx(t) 2
(nɪ + n2)2 (x2(t) + 1)2
n1
∑(
i=1 v
⅛) )+g (τ - a⅛)
n1
i=1
1
αi(t)
n2
+ g
j=1
Recognizing the last two terms as -λ(n1 + n2) and substituting -(nɪ + n2)∕α(t)
15