rate of compliance A as an increase in the compliance rate increases both the social norm and
the market revenue effects. Indeed, the expected utility gain of non compliance ∆W (c, A)
decreases in A because of the market revenue effect. The following lemma indicates some
further comparative results for ∆W (c, A).
Lemma 2 The expected utility gain of non compliance ∆W (c, A)
(i) is increasing in the penalty f for unvoluntary non compliance and the probability μ of
unvoluntary non compliance,
(ii) is decreasing in the penalty F for voluntary non compliance,
(iii) varies ambiguously with the loss δ in market revenue if non compliant, under the as-
sumption of risk aversion
(iv) varies ambiguously with the probability p of being inspected, as long as the probability of
unvoluntary non compliance μ is strictly positive.
Proof: First , we have
-∆W
= μpU'(V - f - c) > 0
-f
and
- ∆W -∆W∂R
ɪ = + p [U (R -c) - U (V - f - c)] > 0
oμ -R -μ
because dg^ < 0, < 0 as shown above and R > V. This proves (i).
Next, we have
- ∆W
-F
-pU'(V - F) < 0
which proves (ii). Considering the impact of δ, we have
-∆W
-δ
-∆W -V -∆W -R
-V -δ+ -R -δ
[pU'(V - F) - μpU'(V - f - c)] -v + [(1 - p)U'(R) - (1 - μp)U'(R - c)] Ц
l j -δ -δ