Strengthening civil society from the outside? Donor driven consultation and participation processes in Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSP): the Bolivian case

being dominated by political criteria instead of merit, the weakness of insti-
tutions and formal rules. These features form the most serious obstacles to
political performance, and the most pertinent causes of corruption. Political
parties play an important role, because they form the vehicle to capture and
circulate state patronage among the middle classes. Bolivia stands out as an
extreme case (Kaufmann et al. 2001). On the other hand, Bolivia has a very
high score on civil liberties (Freedom House 2002; Kaufmann et al. 2001:31)
that partially explains the quite active attitude of civil society. Bolivia is thus
characterized by low government effectiveness, low control of corruption
and low rule of law, yet an open opportunity structure and an active organ-
ized civil society. What can this tell us about the functioning of the new
institutional arrangements? Some scholars argue that as far as Latin Ameri-
can politics are concerned, a new set of rules and institutional arrangements
does not necessarily alter the configuration of power relations. Neither does
it alter the modes in which actors interpret rules, negotiate around them and
apply them as a functions of power resources which are distributed unequal-
ly (Vilas 1997:11). If a system functions predominantly on clientelism and
patronage, this is a vicious circle that is difficult to break (Putnam 1993).

In short, an appreciation of the nature of the political game in Bolivia
should caution us against assuming that new institutional arrangements will
automatically change the political mechanisms that are the root cause of
problematic political performance. The past also indicates the stubbornness
of certain mechanisms. The institutional arrangement that was proposed
by the Law of Popular Participation in 1994 did not fundamentally change
the nature of the political game in Bolivia. Recent literature (Ejdesgaard
Jeppesen 2002) argues that it did not alter the relations between rich and
poor, urban and rural, mestizo and indigenous, and secondly, the all perva-
sive power of the political parties was not counterbalanced by the control
function the Vigilance Committee is entitled to exercise, but rather penetrat-
ed it. The general assessment the CSOs make related to the local structures
is that the civil society organizations at the municipal level - the so-called
Territorial Basis Organizations (Organisaciones Territoriales de Base) - and
the Vigilance Committee have been co-opted into the system and spoiled by
political party benefits and promises. According to Ivan Arias who was at
the time of our research vice-minister of Popular Participation, about 80%
of the presidents of the VCs are members of political parties (interview Ivan
Arias). In this sense, according to Medeiros (2001:413), the state succeeded
in enlarging the sphere of its hegemonic control through shrinking its
responsibilities and enlarging civil society participation. The state ‘created’
civil society by recognizing al sorts of organizations as OTBs and securing
representation in the Vigilance Committee, yet at the same time the state
could, through party politics, control the functioning of these newly created
institutions. Turning back to the PRSP, chances are that the meddling over
the HIPC II resources at the local level will be heavily influenced by party
politics rather than genuine concern for the voiceless and poor constituents.
To therefore argue that the involvement of the opposition in the National
Dialogue (through the presence of the Vice-President of the municipal coun-

IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 13

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