a destabilizing effect on the economy and society. For instance, they attrib-
uted some of the disturbances that occurred during the year of the National
Dialogue to the uncritical support by donors, and warned that donors were
in this way undermining the political stability of the country. The critique
raises interesting challenges for donors: what kind of legal civil society
framework should they support in developing countries? What kind of civil
society organizations should be strengthened? In addition, how should the
institutional task divisions be arranged so as to avoid overlap and institu-
tional weakening of legislative organs?
Perfectly comprehensible reasons may be advanced on why parlia-
ment is being bypassed. On Bolivian soil, two arguments were put forward.
First, parliament has a bad reputation. Bolivian actors (both governmental
and non-governmental) stated in interviews that parliament is not perceived
by most Bolivians as a representative body, that Bolivians do not trust it.
The Latinobarometro11 effectively shows that only 16% of the Bolivians
trust parliament12. But that cannot be a good argument to ignore parliament,
as civil society can never replace it in the task of controlling the executive
branch of government. A second argument is that parliamentary involve-
ment in the PRSP might not actually promote the interests of the poor (ODI
2000: 17). It is said that parliament is corrupt, that members of parliament
are only motivated by personal and material self-interest, that the politi-
cal party to which they belong has a greater influence over them than their
constituencies. Even without questioning the validity of these claims, one
may ask whether it is not likely that similar problems will occur outside the
political sphere? The Latinobarometro shows that in 2000, only 18% of the
Bolivians expressed trust in their fellow citizens, and general trust scores hit
an all time low. The data indicate a deep legitimacy crisis in which political
institutions have lost credibility. Measurements in 2000 showed that only
22% is satisfied with the functioning of democracy (Latinobarometro 2000).
This raises the question to what extent Bolivian citizens trust umbrella-like
civil society organizations, or social movements or grass-root movements to
negotiate on their behalf the PRSP or monitor its implementation? In other
words, to what extent do civil society organizations effectively voice what
lives in society? Are the organizations ‘representing’ in one way or the other
‘the people’. Data collected in Bolivia show that 60% of the population is not
at all involved in associational life. Of the citizens that do participate not less
than 25.6% is member of a religious organization. The second most suc-
cessful organization are sport clubs (17.9%) and labor unions (11.9%)13. The
Church is thus not only an institution that draws quite significant numbers of
people to its organizations, but furthermore it is also highly valued, trusted
and credible. About 82% of Bolivians express trust in the Catholic Church.
Therefore, granting the Church an important role in the installation of the
National Mechanism of Social Control seems logical and might induce the
sentiment that the implementation of the PRSP and the control over HIPC
II resources will be effectively carried out. In our view the installation of
such a control mechanism should not replace or absolve the responsibility
of parliament, and these mechanisms should not function as roundabout
11 See: www.latinobarometro.org
12 Bolivians tend to place more
trust in the armed forces as 29%
expressed trust in the military.
In Latin America in general,
it seems that about 30% of the
citizens trust the President, 34%
trusts the judicial system and
only 19% trusts the political
parties.
13 These data were collected in
2001 by “Variables y Tendencias
SRL, Consultores Asociados”
in co-operation with Caritas
Bolivia. We express our profound
gratitude to Juan Carlos Nunez
who granted us permission to use
these data.
IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 15