society’ in all its components? The sourcebook does not propose guidelines
for distinguishing relevant from less- or non-relevant actors. However, given
the aim of the PRSP, special attention and weight should be given to those
groups that represent the poor and/or those institutions that are specialized
in assessing poverty. In the same vein, it might be justified to neutralize
the potentially negative impact of those groups in civil society that might
jeopardize the pro-poor outcome. Civil society is just as much characterized
by power differences and tensions as any other dimension in society (Howell
2000:9), which suggests that special attention be given to the more vulner-
able groups who are the intended beneficiaries of the new policies. The big
absentees in the Bolivian participatory process however, were the vulnerable
groups: urban and rural poor, indigenous groups, and women (Painter 2002;
interview Juan Carlos Nunez). Limited attention was given to ethnic groups
and gender aspects in the National Dialogue. Quite striking is the fact that
the questionnaires were not made available in indigenous languages, which
limited the opportunity for local level participation (CRS 2001:4).
In participative processes, the absence of vulnerable groups, the ex-
cluded, the poor is not surprising. The literature shows that poor people tend
to be poorly organized (Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1997), and they remain rela-
tively voiceless at the local level and quite reluctant to influence processes
of policy-making affecting broader social groupings. From the perspective
of the poor, there are several problems with political endeavors: they tend
not to deliver immediate material gains; they are often dangerous, in that
they exacerbate the vulnerability of the poor; and they require resources that
the poor seldom possess. But even when the poor participate, participation
might actually confirm the clientelist structures in circumstances where the
poor are highly dependent upon non-poor groups (Vandana 1996; Van der
Linden 1997). If direct participation is problematic for poor people, other,
more indirect mechanisms are called for to address the poverty issue (Eng-
berg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:6). Bolivian government chose to voice the
priorities for poverty reduction through the representative logic, assuming
that the local political level would be much closer to the citizens than the
national level, that the local level knows more about poverty and is aware of
the needs and priorities related to resource allocation to eradicate poverty
(Painter 2002:7). However, there are two important problems related to this
line of thinking. Firstly, the literature strongly suggests that Bolivian politics
is characterized by clientelism and patronage. The local level will most
probably not escape from these mechanisms16. Some argue that the only
thing decentralization brought was the decentralization of nepotism and
corruption (Kaufmann et al.2001:17). So, what are the guarantees that the
municipal participants in the round tables were genuinely representing the
needs and priorities related to reducing poverty? In many situations particu-
lar groups are exactly trying to maintain the inequalities and the economic
exploitation (Engberg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:3). This is not to say that
there are no reformers among the ‘winners’ in a given system. But to assume
that significant proposals for genuine reform and change will be forthcom-
ing from an elite that owes its success to the status quo, might be somewhat
16 Kaufmann et al. (2001:41)
argue that “major transparency-
related reforms are needed at
the local level, where substantial
weaknesses persist, and where
many municipalities and local
agencies are rife with corruption
18 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05