and representativeness of intermediate NGOs specialized in advocacy and
lobbying. The latter organizations do not always have direct relations with
the local level, yet they try to influence politics and compete for resources
on behalf of certain groups. This tension between two different organiza-
tional formats surfaced during the Dialogue: representation versus expertise.
According to elected representatives, one can only meaningfully participate
when one has a mandate that is supported by voters or members. Legitimacy
is thus about the numbers one represents, numbers make the claim or inter-
est legitimate. On the other hand, the organizations that are highly special-
ized often draw upon normative or moral grounds for legitimacy: gender,
human rights, ethnicity, the environment... are in themselves legitimate
issues, because of the moral weight or the public good aspects these topics
carry. As the participatory process from the outset focused on representa-
tion, CSOs found their margin of influence much reduced because their
points of view were attacked as lacking legitimacy.
By way of conclusion, it seems relevant to place the National Dialogue
in the wider political landscape and try to assess its importance in com-
parison with other events. Although the launching of the National Dialogue
was covered by the press and media, it was eclipsed by the conflicts that
were taking place on the streets. The months before, during and after the
Dialogue were unusually conflictive and violent ones (interview Carlos Vil-
legas; Hugo Fernandez). Ironically enough, government was sitting around
the table with ‘civil society’, while at the same time, in the streets, harsh
confrontations were taking place between armed government forces and a
wide array of organizations. Due to the social unrests, the closing stages of
the National Dialogue did not receive much attention in the press. The rela-
tive ‘unimportance’ of the Dialogue is confirmed by a poll held at the time
in which only 12% of the people interviewed replied they knew of the exist-
ence of the National Dialogue. The people who were aware of the Dialogue
were mostly individuals with high income (Andersen & Nina 2001: 361).
Of these ‘informed citizens’ however, not less than 86% of the middle and
low-income respondents thought that the Dialogue was a political maneuver
(ibid: 362)17. Clearly, most Bolivians did not know about the National Dia-
logue, and when they knew, they tended not to believe in the sincere motiva-
tions of government. This is another illustration of the deep-seated distrust
of Bolivians in their government
17 The poll only included persons
from large or organized business
- none from micro-enterprises.
We should not forget how dubious and contradictory the position of
the Bolivian government towards civil society has been. On the one hand,
participation was granted and stimulated; on the other hand ruthless reac-
tions against civil society protest were not shunned. Clashes between the
security forces and civil society have been numerous during the last couple
of years, and they often turned violent. The campaign of the Banzer govern-
ment to eradicate coca production in the Chapare region, as part of its fight
against drugs, is a case in point. Many of the coca farmers are poor immi-
grants from the Andean highlands and for them the production of coca, a
traditional crop in Bolivia used for local consumption (the leaves are chewed
20 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05