In the case of Bolivia, one could argue that there is sufficient evidence
to answer this question in the positive. In a country that up to the 1970s had
been one of the most unstable of the continent four consecutive coalition
governments, all of them democratically elected, and in which all the main
political parties participated at one time or another, enacted unpopular Bret-
ton Woods policies. This by itself is a remarkable fact. This would not have
been possible if there had not been a considerable measure of agreement
among the political elite across the major political parties that those policies
were in its own interests and that of the country. On the other hand, one can-
not dismiss the important influence of extensive and continuous donor pres-
ence. The widespread perception in Bolivia is that the liberal macro-eco-
nomic policies followed since 1985 were prescribed by the World Bank and
the IMF. At the same time those policies have been increasingly accepted
and internalized by an elite that is not only acutely aware of the importance
of being on good terms with the donors, but has been spoon-fed with the
same liberal ideas. At any rate, donors are satisfied that the Bolivian govern-
ment owns the macroeconomic reform program20. There is also no doubt
that Bolivia has the analytical capacity in the top-layer of the technocracy to
make macroeconomic assessments and to write coherent plans. The Boliv-
ian PRSP is technically of good quality and is home-produced. In addition,
there has been a considerable dose of civil society participation. However,
here a problem arises. Broad-based participation does not seem to have
produced the intended consensus on the strategy. The idea often put forward
by donors, implicitly and explicitly, is that harmony and consensus will
result from participation, that synergies between civil society and govern-
ment are created when they enter into a dialogue. As if vertically opposing
interests do not exist within civil society; as if consensus is something that is
always achievable. This is not very credible, especially in complex, multi-
ethnic societies with deep inequalities and extreme socio-economic gaps.
Civil society is diverse, heterogeneous, and contains a wide array of groups
defending conflicting interest. As discussed before in the paper, the partici-
pation process in Bolivia has brought latent conflicts to the surface and it has
created new cleavages. Participation thus can and has brought division, disa-
greement, and profound opposition. At the same time, it just as well forged
new alliances and synergies. In Bolivia, some groups in civil society indeed
feel ownership over the PRSP, while others cannot but feel alienated and
excluded. Representatives of Jubilee and the National Consultation lamented
that they do not find their suggestions in the final draft of the PRSP. Large
populations furthermore do not seem to agree with the fundamental issues
of the macro-economic policies. As stated before the underlying macro-
economic policies are heavily criticized by labor unions and quite a lot of
NGOs. The 2002 elections also show the political support for anti-systemic
candidates like Evo Morales who completely reject the neo-liberal policies.
20 In a 2001 assessment of 46
countries by the World Bank,
only Ghana and Mauritania get
better total scores on ownership
than Bolivia. See World Bank
(2001b: annex)
All in all, ownership is a woolly and slippery concept when used in
the context of PRSP. It is also a typical case of donor-speak. Donors use aid
as a negotiating weapon to bring recipient governments in line with their
own evolving views about how the economy should be run and how political
IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05 • 23