naïve. Correction mechanisms are thus justified from a pro-poor point of
view. Secondly, making abstraction of the clientelist mechanisms, one can-
not assume that the local level is about homogenous communities having
reached a consensus regarding development priorities. The local level is
heterogeneous, marked by social stratification and power differences. Local
political power will thus most probably be yielded in the interest of the more
powerful and organized groups, i.e. the local mestizo elite rather than in the
interest of the local indigenous poor (Andersson 1999:6). It is very difficult
to tune down the vested, powerful and organized interests in favor of the
unorganized and voiceless poor. A local process, no matter how open, par-
ticipative and democratic in content, does not necessarily produce outcomes
that are in the best interest of the poor. It may even work to the benefit of the
poor when top-down non-participative, but pro-poor schemes are simply
imposed to neutralize all too powerful local brokers and patrons (Vandana
1996; Van der Linden 1997). In the case of Bolivia, doubts have also been
expressed regarding the capability of local office holders to correctly assess
poverty issues and to propose effective and remediating solutions. Witness
the frequent ‘wish list’ phenomenon, where municipalities ask for things like
‘repairing the statue of the local saint’ or ‘redecorating the central plaza’ as
part of their poverty reduction plan (interview McLean). It is therefore in
some cases wholly justified to rely more on technical expertise and/or actors
that have specialized knowledge regarding poverty-assessment and are situ-
ated above the local level. Attempts to influence policies and decisions af-
fecting the conditions of the poor are typically, but not exclusively, undertak-
en by various kinds of organization on their behalf. It is assumed that these
organizations have clearly identified with the interests and concerns of the
poor in order to act on their behalf. (Engberg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:6).
When specialized organizations lobby on behalf of the poor, this naturally
creates problems of representation, first, because the interests and concerns
of the poor must pass through intermediaries who must identify with their
interests, and second, because these same intermediaries have their own
concerns and interests. The pro-poor policies they try to press through are
thus heavily determined by the pro-poor orientation of the organizational
landscape (Engberg-Pedersen & Webster 2002:6). From a theoretical and
pro-poor point of view, it thus seems legitimate to steer and manipulate the
process in favor of the vulnerable groups and invoke technical expertise and
the use of tools such as Participatory Poverty Assessment. This however did
not take place in Bolivia.
The involvement of intermediary organizations not only remained
very limited, but also gave rise to a new cleavage within civil society:
representativeness versus expertise. This cleavage manifested itself during
the participation process. Local level elected actors regularly questioned the
legitimacy and representativeness of large intermediate NGOs: on behalf
of whom are they claiming access to resources and are they participating in
decision-making processes? Who has given them a mandate? How many
people do they represent? The organizations in the Bolivian civil society that
function with membership and representations questioned the legitimacy
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