cil in the municipal round tables) contributes to the continuity of the PRSP
across different governmental coalitions, may well be a naïve interpretation
of Bolivian reality.
Regarding the strengthening of civil society, a general criticism is in
order. The strengthening of civil society organizations -- supporting them
financially, motivating them to monitor government and make construc-
tive contributions -- should not go at the expense of the institution that in
a democracy is supposed to perform these functions, namely parliament.
Most PRSP participation processes treat parliament very casually, almost
dismissively (Eberlei 2001: 12; Eurodad 2000, 2001), as if its core function
of controlling the government could just as well be taken over by un-elected
civil society organizations. Parliament should control, discuss, debate, reject
or approve. That is the nature of the political game. Crucially, parliament
can be held accountable by the public. Members of parliament that do not
do their job well can loose their mandate. Civil society organizations on the
other hand do not run that risk: they are not held accountable; they do not
risk their jobs and future. It thus seems quite unhealthy to deposit such a
large part of the control function of the poverty reduction strategy solely in
the hands of private organizations.
An additional advantage of parliament is related to the fact that it con-
stitutes an indirect form of representation. This allows the government to get
approval from parliament for technically complex decisions, such as those
relating to macroeconomic reform that may not carry the immediate approv-
al of the general population. At the next parliamentary elections, when some
of the results of the decisions have become manifest, the population is in a
better position to judge whether such decisions were well founded or not.
It could be argued that this is what happened in Bolivia, where since 1985
four successive democratically elected governments have each obtained the
approval of parliament for unpopular but necessary reforms imposed by the
donor community. It is unlikely that any of them would have succeeded if it
had to get approval from the population through a process of participation
of CSOs. The Bolivian parliament has not been much involved in the PRSP.
The PRSP was itself not submitted to a parliamentary vote, although some
features regarding its implementation were approved by law. The opposition
parties were invited to participate in the political dialogue, but the underly-
ing consensus model did not fit well with the political tradition in Bolivia,
where opposition parties essentially oppose anything that comes from the
government and wait their turn at the next elections to govern.
Added to that, Bolivia, like many developing countries, does not have
a very effective legal and administrative framework to control, monitor,
audit or sanction NGOs and other CSOs. The law of the jungle pretty much
rules the space of civil society organizations, and there are few rules or lim-
its to what they are allowed to do. Bolivian government officials complained
to us during interviews that donors quite unselectively supported all kinds of
organizations that wear a civil society jacket, even when their activities had
14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05