Job quality and labour market performance



14 | Erhel & Guergoat-Larivière

We observe that the higher the diploma, the lower the proportion of temporary contracts in New
Member States, while in EU15 countries these contracts are particularly concentrated among
low-skilled workers. On the other hand, part-time work is quite equally distributed in EU15
according to qualifications (around the 23% average in each class), whereas it particularly
affects low-skilled workers in the New Member States (15.3% vs. 6.9% on average).

Comparing levels of wages according to the level of initial education leads to quite well-known
conclusions in the EU15: both monthly and annual wages grow gradually along with the level of
qualifications. In the New Member States, we observe a rather strange feature: high-skilled
workers declare earning less than medium and even low-skilled workers. However, there may
be some declaration problems as the ‘no answer’ category displays much higher wages than any
other.

Figure 9. Access to further training by education level (% of the adult population (25-64 years))

Low educational Medium educational High educational              Total

attainment              attainment              attainment


hal-00616771, version 1 - 24 Aug 2011


Source: Compendium (2009).

The indicator for training and education is also very meaningful: the higher the initial
qualifications, the higher the access to continuous training. This feature observed at the
European level recalls that continuous training generally does not play a compensatory role in
favour of less educated workers and essentially benefits already highly skilled people.

All in all, initial education levels largely influence workers’ job quality. People with low
education levels face greater socio-economic insecurity in terms of wages and work contract
and are less likely to receive training. The probability of their acceding to a better job through
complementary education is then very limited.

4.4 Contractual variety and job quality

Comparing heterogeneity according to the nature of work contract is a rather tricky exercise as
types of contracts vary considerably from one European country to another and thus are not
always directly comparable. However, available data give a first picture of inequalities between
‘stable’ and ‘unstable’ workers.

Mean wages in euro of course vary on a very wide range across the enlarged European Union: a
monthly mean wage is €517 in the NMS whereas it reaches €2,450 in the EU15. As we have
seen before, the proportion of temporary workers is quite similar in the EU15 and in the NMS:
about 15% of employees have a temporary work contract in the EU27. The difference between
wages associated to fixed-term contracts and indefinite duration contracts is much more notable



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