19
The exclusiveness of the participation of both the MTF and Nestlé is also
reflected in labour’s absence, pointing to the interest-restrictive nature of the
implementation process. Because of the negative effects of the merger on employment,
labour’s virtual role is even more significant. Despite its inability to directly negotiate
with both parties, labour nevertheless attempted to influence the outcome through the
Community’s legal channels. After Commission approval of Nestlé/Perrier, workers
from Grandes Sources, one of the mineral water springs making up Perrier, lodged an
ECJ appeal on the basis of improper consultation. Awaiting the ECJ’s decision, labour
also requested to the Court of First Instance (CFI) to have all redundancies and transfer of
control of Perrier to Nestlé temporarily suspended, subject to the results of the ECJ’s
inquiry. Ultimately, labour lost on both fronts. The CFI decided that it was the
Commission’s job to rule on mergers according to a strict timetable and the Court refused
to take action that might interfere with the merger. The ECJ also sided with the
Commission, although the judge stated that “the rights of workers during merger
operations merited profound study” (Anonymous 1993). Analysis of subsequent mergers
show that ‘workers rights’ have not been represented or considered by the MTF.25
A second aspect of the Community’s institutional structure that silenced labour is
seen in the actions of the Advisory Committee on Concentrations. MCR regulations state
that when a merger is subject to Phase II investigations the advisory opinion of this
committee, chaired by the Commission and comprised of representatives from Member
States (usually from their competition authority), must be taken into account. Through
this Committee other interests that may have been excluded from previous decision-
making, such as labour or the environmentalist lobby, can theoretically raise concerns.
However, “although the MTF claims it pays more than mere lip service to the Advisory
Committee’s opinion, the truth of the matter is that the Advisory Committee has minimal
influence on the Commission’s decision and is likely to be ignored if its opinion strays
from the preliminary decision drafted by the MTF”(Maciver 1991, 762). Such a dynamic
reinforces the idea that the options for labour to be involved in the MCR decision-making
framework are relatively limited.
Beyond its lack of success at, or exclusion from, the European institutional
structure a third reason for labour’s absence in the implementation phase is based on the