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With regard to the first main conclusion, we have attempted to add theoretical
precision by arguing that different communities found throughout different phases of a
policy process within the same issue area may be related, but they are not necessarily
comprised of the exact same specific actors. In particular, we have argued that during the
formulation phase of the MCR, one witnessed the existence of a ‘macro’ community,
comprised of several DGs within the European Commission led by DG Competition as
well as representatives of capital actors from organizations, such as the ERT. However,
when MCR rules were put into practice, the community for making decisions was
‘refined’ in the sense that the main players in this ‘micro’ community were representative
of specific actors within these two groups from within the ‘macro’ community, namely
the Merger Task Force and the specific merging firms. The relationships between the two
communities are two-fold. On the one hand, we suggested that the goals of both
communities are similar and are reflective of a lasting relationship between the main
actors, namely the Commission and capital. One can also see ‘overlap’ in these particular
communities: leaders of DG Competition, for example, were main players within the
‘macro-community’ that formulated the MCR, while also being crucial in determining
how the MTF would function. On the other hand, outcomes of the implementation phase
were dynamic and eventually resulted in a type of feedback between the communities.
Because rules previously negotiated (by the macro-community in the formulation phase)
had become redefined (by the micro-community in the implementation one) to achieve
the specific goals of members of the ‘micro’ community, this points to the idea that the
relationship between the two types of communities is not necessarily static. This was
particularly seen when the MTF was able to use the Nestlé/Perrier merger as a means to
increase its regulatory domain by establishing a (new) ‘collective dominance’ policy that
had not previously existed within the MCR framework.
Secondly, we have explained that the development of these communities is based on
the self-supporting, private interests of the actors, which motivates a bargaining
relationship based not only on resources, but also respect for and fear of each other.
When the MCR was developed, we argued that the Commission sought to regulate in
order to increase efficiency of single market, while capital representatives sought to have
rules clearly defined so as to not disadvantage themselves. During the Nestlé/Perrier