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(such as member state governments, regional governments, and specific actors in the
farming community) guided by their self supporting interests who may change the nature
of the policy. Some evidence of this is seen in flax subsidies where, despite the existence
of EU directives negotiated between the Council, Commission and larger farming
interests to regulate flax subsidies, poor implementation of the rules by specific, but
related, domestic and supranational actors ultimately changed the nature and
effectiveness of the policy (Kerby and Chari 2002). Similarly, rules surrounding EU
state aid control may be formulated at a more ‘macro’ level by general actors such as the
Commission, the Council and capital representatives. However, the implementation of
such rules when specific cases are investigated may be negotiated by a more specific set
of related actors in a ‘micro’ community who effectively change the ‘rules of the game.’
As recent evidence suggests, although specific capital and Community actors involved in
investigating aids are part of the ‘macro’ community that helped define the nature of state
aid rules, their own specific, self-supporting, goals guided them to turn a blind eye to
potential infringements during state aid decision making, resulting in the very object of
regulation being ignored (Chari and Cavatorta 2002). This suggests that a potential
avenue for future research should not only be focused on how related communities of
like-minded actors are involved during the different phases of policy-making, but how
their actions may result in a type of feedback that may have a dynamic effect on the
evolution of the policy over time.
Secondly, this study suggests that in order to fully understand institutional dynamics,
comparative political scientists must pay more attention to the private desires of policy-
makers and how this is intertwined with their ‘private fears.’ There is no doubt of the
value of different authors’ arguments that actors in a community negotiate because they
are dependent on each others’ resources. However, this study has also extended on this
idea by suggested that, without necessarily being in a hierarchical relationship, an
important element in explaining why communities develop and persist over time lies in
the actors’ own private interests, coupled with their own fear. Such interests and fears
guide actors while also constrain them from acting alone. As seen particularly in the
dynamics of the Nestlé/Perrier negotiation, institutional actors seek to pursue outcomes
that extend their own power position and not necessarily seek to maximize public