25
NOTES
1 We are indebted to Arantza Gomez who has performed research assistance for this project. And we
gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the IIIS and the encouragement of its Director, Philip Lane,
who has supported our research work on regulation.
2 See also Wilks (1989) and Wright (1991) for further insights.
3 As discussed in Rhodes (1997). It is noteworthy that these points help distinguish the
community/network approach from other approaches such as pluralism, elitism and corporatism: there is
no equal access to the (theoretically open) policy-making process for an unlimited number of freely
competing actors as pluralism argues (Klijn 1997); there is no exclusive and privileged position for
private (economic) actors unilaterally imposing decisions as elitism contends; and there is no fixed,
tripartite power consisting of the sate, labour, and capital as discussions informed by corporatism suggest.
4 Klijn (1997, 27-8) also states that “nearly all authors underline the fact that actors within a policy
community have certain interests in common which separate them from the actors of other policy
communities and from actors not included in their particular community.”
5 For examples of public interest theorists, see Posner (1970, 1976); Long et al. (1973); Scherer (1990)
and Hazlett (1986). However, the seminal work is Bork (1979). More recent ‘public’ interest theory, as
seen in the work of (Noll and Owen 1983), known as normative positive theory (NPT), argues that when
regulatory problems arise given the self-interest of economic actors, there should be a prescription of
reforms including that enforcement agencies work more effectively, that legislators and government
officials learn economic principles, and that incumbent policy-makers resign in the interests of serving
the public.
6 For an in-depth discussion see Shughart and Tollison (1985) and Shughart (1990).
7 Data can be found at AMDATA
8 Even though the College of Commissioners theoretically has the final say, there has not been a decision
taken by the MTF that has been overturned at this level. However, there have been some decisions that
have provoked heavy debates in the College. An example of this was the de Havilland case (1992a),
which resulted in the first prohibited merger under the MCR. The main debate centered on what criteria
should be used in merger analysis. The French delegation argued for social and industrial criteria to be
included and for the merger to be allowed. However, those in the Commission and the MTF, who
agreed with Commissioner Brittan’s ‘competition only’ criteria, won. The debate set the stage for the
future of the MCR and put an end to the possibility that the MCR could be used to strengthen European
industry via the creation of European Champions.
9 The Community dimension of a merger is assessed using thresholds based on the turnover of the firms
involved. The most important are the worldwide threshold (EURO 5 billion) and the Community-wide
threshold (EURO 100 Million). Below these thresholds, the comparable authorities in the Member
States carry out merger control.
10 Several pieces have been influenced by this school of thought attempting to understand businesses
influence on EU policy-making given the new centre of European governance. For example, see Cowles
(1996, 1998) and Bennett (1997).
11 ERT is a forum of 42 European industrial leaders aiming at
promoting the competitiveness and growth of the Single Market.
12 The similarities between the White Paper and the ERT proposal were substantial with the only
difference being the 1992 deadline for member state compliance instead of the ERT’s overly optimistic
1990 deadline. Once the capital-inspired single market package was proposed the ERT vigorously
lobbied undecided national government leaders. According to Richardson, a former ERT chairman,
“Wisse Dekker of Philips made it (the single market) his main priority for four years. Bearing in mind
that when it was launched governments were not very keen, we helped a lot to push it through”
(Balanya et al. 2000, 22).
13 The establishment of the ERT represented important new fora that sought to
collectively represent Capital interests at the EU. By organizing and presenting a
unified vision of Europe, these organizations developed legitimacy in the public sphere and thus were
considered “politically safe” policy partners by the EC institutions.
14 The two main constraining effects are, “ (a) increasing competition in international goods and services