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investigation the MTF sought to increase its institutional power and carve out a
previously non-existent regulatory policy niche, while Nestlé in particular desired
expansion into different (French) markets. Both scenarios demonstrate that private
interests brought them together into creating an interdependent, closed community with
highly restrictive membership. This last point was demonstrated by the lack of role of
labour, both in formulating the MCR and involvement in the Nestlé/Perrier decision. We
argued that its exclusion from the process is based not only on the fact that its goals were
not necessarily supportive of the other actors, but also because it was not in a power
position vis-à-vis the other players, highlighting that interdependency within the
community was also based on the potential threat that actors posed to each other. This
suggests that respect for each others’ goals along with potential conflict between main
players helps achieve satisfactory outcomes.
It is useful to attempt to extract general lessons from this study that may be of value
to students of comparative European politics. Indeed, one may justifiably argue that any
generalisation must be made in caution: because this study has focused on EU merger
policy, deeper research is still needed in other areas of both domestic and supranational
policy-making. Nevertheless, this study may still offer insights that can be verified or
falsified by other scholars in future work. With this in mind, the paper considers two
main lessons.
First, the concept of ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ communities existing at both the
formulation and implementation phases of policy offers a framework for comparativists
to better understand which types of actors will form bonds with each other in different
stages of the policy-making process. The argument offered here is that while the (larger)
‘macro’ community helps define the nature of regulations, a related, but not necessarily
equally composed, ‘micro’ community eventually implements the rules, potentially
changing the nature of the policy itself via a feedback process. Such a distinction between
the actions of both communities may be of particular value in understanding
developments in other domestic and supranational policy areas. Turning to the latter level
of governance, for example, although Common Agriculture Policy regulations may be
defined at the larger level (by the Council of Ministers, Commission and EU farming
interests), how the rules are ultimately enforced depends on the actions of specific actors