Table 1: The Flat Tax Was Not Part of Other Reforms
|
Variable |
A. |
B. |
C. |
D-t |
|
Constant |
-32.65*** |
-35.36*** |
-37.06*** |
40.08*** |
|
(4.49) |
(9.39) |
(9.64) |
(5.18) | |
|
Privatization |
.23 |
.20 |
.16 |
.62* |
|
(.17) |
(.21) |
(.24) |
(.25) | |
|
Current acct |
.27 |
.38 |
.54 |
-.18 |
|
liberalization |
(.57) |
(.65) |
(.77) |
(.48) |
|
Price |
-.0002 |
-.0008 |
-.002 |
-.001 |
|
liberalization |
(.002) |
(.003) |
(.003) |
(.002) |
|
Institutional |
.002 |
-.003 |
.004 |
-.02 |
|
reform |
(.05) |
(.06) |
(.06) |
(.03) |
|
Capital-account |
1.07*** |
1.06*** |
1.12** |
-1.16*** |
|
openness |
(.27) |
(.35) |
(.37) |
(.22) |
|
Political |
-.17 |
-.44 |
-.72 |
7.68* |
|
constraints |
(2.06) |
(2.04) |
(2.56) |
(3.17) |
|
Ideology |
.36*** |
.48* |
.53** |
-.15** |
|
(.13) |
(.26) |
(.27) |
(.07) | |
|
Diffusion |
16.5*** |
15.57*** |
14.59** |
- |
|
(1.93) |
(2.48) |
(2.71) | ||
|
Distance from |
.002** |
.002* |
.002* |
.004*** |
|
Rhein |
(.001) |
(.001) |
(.001) |
(.001) |
|
FDI |
-.95 |
-.89 |
-.58 |
-3.06** |
|
competition |
(.63) |
(1.05) |
(1.02) |
(.61) |
|
Spatial lag |
- |
13.06 |
-4.92 |
.11* |
|
(unweighted) |
(8.16) |
(12.14) |
(.07) | |
|
Spatial lag |
- |
- |
5.2** |
- |
|
(FDI-weighted) |
(2.30) | |||
|
Pseudo-R2 |
.69 |
.81 |
.82 |
t.51 |
|
Log-Likelihood |
-38.53 |
-23.47 |
-22.47 |
tP > F =.000 |
Dependent variable is adoption of the flat tax for a given country year. Standard errors in parentheses.
Logit estimation via multiple imputation, with fixed effects for year, temporal controls and the lagged
dependent variable are omitted. N=300. Pseudo-R2 and log-likelihood are calculated from one single
dataset, multiple imputation does not report them. *Significant at p<.10 level, **significant at p<.05
level, ***significant at p<.001 level. ↑OLS regression, dependent variable is the top marginal individual
tax rate, same model specification as in Models A-C.
37