|
Table 2: Traditional Taxation Models Plus Diffusion and Ideology | ||||
|
Variable |
E. |
F. |
G. |
H. |
|
Constant |
-15.35** |
-33.21*** |
-31.38*** |
-32.94*** |
|
(6.62) |
(8.3) |
(8.78) |
(10.53) | |
|
Percent |
.51* |
.40 |
.35 |
.41 |
|
elderly |
(.27) |
(.28) |
(.30) |
(.31) |
|
Public Debt |
.11 |
.08 |
.04 |
.04 |
|
(.08) |
(.09) |
(.11) |
(.11) | |
|
Growth |
.08 |
.08 |
.11 |
.16* |
|
(.06) |
(.07) |
(.07) |
(.09) | |
|
Income |
-.0001 |
-.0001 |
-.0001 |
-.0001 |
|
(.0001) |
(.0001) |
(.0001) |
(.0001) | |
|
Trade |
.008 |
-.0001 |
-.008 |
-.014 |
|
(.01) |
(.01) |
(.15) |
(.02) | |
|
Industry |
-.024 |
.022 |
.001 |
-.027 |
|
(.11) |
(.14) |
(.15) |
(.19) | |
|
Unemployment |
.003 |
-.01 |
-.003 |
.01 |
|
(.08) |
(.08) |
(.09) |
(.09) | |
|
Political |
- |
-.05 |
-.58 |
-1.2 |
|
constraints |
(1.8) |
(2.1) |
(2.1) | |
|
Capital-account |
.93*** |
.99*** |
.96** |
1.05** |
|
openness |
(.26) |
(.30) |
(.31) |
(.36) |
|
FDI |
-.61 |
-.76 |
-.58 |
-.33 |
|
competition |
(.42) |
(.54) |
(.68) |
(.76) |
|
Diffusion |
- |
16.71*** |
16.11*** |
15.58*** |
|
(2.03) |
(2.7) |
(2.25) | ||
|
Ideology |
- |
.28** |
.36** |
.44** |
|
(.10) |
(.15) |
(.21) | ||
|
Spatial lag |
- |
- |
8.71** |
-9.90 |
|
(unweighted) |
(4.8) |
(8.2) | ||
|
Spatial lag |
- |
- |
- |
5.5** |
|
(FDI-weighted) |
(2.2) | |||
|
Pseudo-R2 |
.66 |
.70 |
.74 |
.78 |
|
Log-Likelihood |
-42.62 |
-37.85 |
-31.81 |
-28.38 |
Dependent variable is adoption of the flat tax for a given country year. Standard errors in parentheses.
Logit estimation via multiple imputation with fixed effects for year, temporal controls and the lagged
dependent variable are omitted. N=300. Pseudo-R2 and log-likelihood are calculated from one single
dataset, multiple imputation does not report them. *Significant at p<.10 level, **significant at p<.05
level, ***significant at p<.001 level.
38