administer than a cash-based system.26 However, governments have been
attracted to vouchers due to the deterrent effect that has sometimes been
ascribed to such non-cash schemes. Finally, allowing asylum seekers to
work while their claim to asylum status is being assessed has also
sometimes been regarded as a potential pull factor for asylum seekers. All
countries of destination have work restrictions for asylum seekers in
place. However, a number of countries have gone further and now prohibit
asylum seekers to undertake any work until their asylum claim has been
accepted.
To assess the potential deterrence effect of the above measures, three
dummy variables were created which take the value 1 (for each year and
country) for the existence of a dispersal scheme, a non-cash based system
of benefits, and a law which prohibits asylum seekers to work until their
claim has been accepted. Adding all the dummy variables for all five of the
above potential deterrence measures for each country and each year,
results in a country's deterrence index for a particular year.27 The
expectation is that the higher the index for a particular country in a
particular year, the lower that country's relative attractiveness will be and
hence its relative burden stemming from asylum applications. Table 2
summarises the expected relationships between the variables discussed
above.
26 In the light of strong protests by human rights NGOs and rising costs, the UK has
recently abandoned its voucher scheme and reintroduced the previous cash-based system.
27 As a simplifying assumption, I take each of the five policy measure to have the same
potential deterrence effect.
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