Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power: An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households



Table 4

Impact of Alternative Power Measures on Leisure Time
By Country, Gender, and Type of Day

United States

Denmark

Women

Men

Non-work

Days

Women

Men

Work

Days

Non-work

Days

Work

Days

Work

Days

Non-work

Days

Work

Days

Non-work

Days

Sample Means:

Education Difference

0.23

-0.11

0.12

0.02

0.12

0.10

-0.06

-0.08

Relative Lifetime Earnings

0.45

0.44

0.56

0.56

Sex Ratio

1.01

1.02

1.00

1.00

1.07

1.08

1.08

1.08

Individual Norms

46.81

48.09

45.19

45.16

49.18

52.46

47.30

49.53

Social Norms

65.51

65.12

65.36

65.38

88.47

88.62

88.50

88.73

Coefficient Estimates:

Power: Education Share

17.14

121.23 **

43.77

138.85 *

-10.19

190.46 *

-94.15

89.19

Power: Education Difference

0.69

2.22 **

1.14

3.68 **

-0.44

4.08 *

-1.76

2.40

Power: Relative Lifetime Earnings

-34.72

63.57

-65.24

-191.51

Power &

13.14

135.15 ***

38.68

138.00 *

-33.29

194.51 *

-92.23

111.76

Power*Low Education

15.20

-48.39 **

27.62

2.78

-50.90

9.76

4.75

47.49

Power &

17.50

121.09 **

43.60

138.69 *

-4.41

197.01 *

-92.82

91.48

Sex Ratio

-99.56

12.25

-20.38

-36.83

-91.01

-200.36

-75.37

-151.40

Power

640.80

1087.40

-270.95

-1245.54

2836.14

978.70

-2511.90

7287.27 *

Sex Ratio

314.04

291.60

-524.74

-324.48

728.48

-638.54

-971.67

909.30

Individual Norms

65.71

313.21

349.07

-386.43

6.82

8.92

-2.21

25.75 *

Social Norms

-273.77

-46.91

122.71

-582.93

0.90

-1.51

-0.43

-0.81

Power*Sex Ratio

-827.12

-578.48

1033.62

601.84

-1658.22

901.37

1788.72

-2192.99

Power*Individual Norms

-83.11

-770.28

-694.43

690.49

-13.21

-21.27

3.80

-56.74 **

Power*Social Norms

563.78

241.50

-608.48

758.11

2.17

2.62

3.58

5.56

Asterisks indicate statistical significance: *** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Both the Danish and the US models contain the same set of explanatory variables reported on in Table 2.

37



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