Ie
αK
α-z
τI
θτIFG
+ zIPG
α-zI
τ -
τ IFG
τI
θτIFG
θ
θ-1
τI
α-zI
(18)
Parameter zI is assumed to be small enough such that α> zI . This leads to a condition for both
domestic and imported input to be positive as follows:
zDIe<τ-z IFGe<αDIe,
IIIFG
where DIe = DI * and IFGe = IFG* as specified in the previous section. The latter condition
defines some relation between tariff factors, frequency of occurrence, and cost parameters.
As in the previous case in section 3.2, the crux of the welfare analysis lies in the input
market, as allocative efficiency increases unambiguously in the output market. The surplus from
the derived demand DI can be measured in terms of the DFG producer surplus by integrability
and can be abstracted from. Hence, welfare consequences in the input market hinge on the
producer surplus for input D and the deadweight loss associated with the DI derived demand:
we∣ = 0.5De [r∣ -z,Γ z',G1
IFGe]- ∫/lDId(τ,τFG)dτ-DIe
= 0.5De [τ, - z,Γ - z,roIFGe ^∖ - K (θτ,ro )' ")
II IFG IFG
'θ - ' τ θ/(θ-')
θ θ i
+ Ti 17cθ-')
(19)
How does the equilibrium look after the reform? We now reduce the tariff escalation by
reducing tIFG to tINFG < tIFG and keeping tI constant. Denote the new equilibrium by a superscript
(ee). The equilibrium levels of FGee , DFGee , IFG ee , and DIee remain the same as those in the
initial equilibrium (**) in the situation with absence of invasive species risks associated with
imported processed good.
6 we use D = τι - zPG1FG z Dl , and Г = aDI’ + zPG1FG - τι
α-zI
α-zI
16