Tariff Escalation and Invasive Species Risk



and that

dD = ( τI /α )dln τI

we have

dI = (DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )] - ( τI /α )dln τI

which leads to the condition

(DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )] - ( τI /α )dln τI < 0,4

which after simplification leads to

d ln tIFG > 1 + (1 - θ)τi
dln τI        DI

(16)


A subset of the joint tariff reforms decreasing deadweight loss does not exacerbate the
externality, which the relative tariff factor falls "strongly" enough. We formalize this result in the
following proposition.

Proposition 2. Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., starting from an initial tariff
escalation, reducing tariff escalation with a joint tariff reduction, increases welfare and reduces
IS risk iff the joint reduction satisfy the following condition

d ln tIFG > 1 + (1 - θ)τi
dln τI        DI

The intuition of the condition is straightforward. The larger the elasticity of the derived
demand
DI is with respect to the processed output price, the larger is the decrease in DI and raw
imports
I in response to a decrease of the final-good tariff factor τIFG. The smaller the raw input
supply response is or the own-price elasticity of derived demand is in absolute value, the smaller

4 In elasticity terms the expression is


d ln tIFG > 1 + sDεDP1>
d ln tI         ηDIPn-.

, noting thatηDIPFG= -ηDIPD, sD = D/DI, and


d ln tIFG > 1 + sDεDPo  ηDIPD

d ln tI            ПDIPra

FG

14



More intriguing information

1. The name is absent
2. Foreword: Special Issue on Invasive Species
3. Conditions for learning: partnerships for engaging secondary pupils with contemporary art.
4. An Incentive System for Salmonella Control in the Pork Supply Chain
5. Washington Irving and the Knickerbocker Group
6. The name is absent
7. Evidence of coevolution in multi-objective evolutionary algorithms
8. Models of Cognition: Neurological possibility does not indicate neurological plausibility.
9. Labour Market Flexibility and Regional Unemployment Rate Dynamics: Spain (1980-1995)
10. The name is absent