M. Geuze
to conform to their interests. The law prohibits big companies from buying out small
landholders. In 1911, when the companies sought to buy grapes from outside the
region there was a riot. An attempt to expand the geography of the “Champagne”
region also led to violence. Small growers have retained their clout because increasing
demand for Champagne requires an ever-increasing supply. But vineyards are fixed,
and grape prices can only rise. Further, as GIs are about “quality”, and with
consumers becoming more discerning, small farmers are increasingly becoming their
own producers of “exclusive” Champagne. This is like in Burgundy, where the best
wines are made and bottled by small farmers. EU rulings on anti-competition prohibit
companies from colluding with growers to fix grape prices. An analysis of
Champagne’s evolution has two lessons for new GI marketing in Asia-Pacific. First, it
takes a lot of time, patience, savvy marketing and quality control to create a valuable
GI. (Champagne took 150 years.) Second, pro-development legal regulations by the
state can empower small farmers and users of traditional knowledge to retain their
influence over corporate juggernauts.
In many, if not all, countries, unfair competition laws or consumer protection laws
contain general provisions dealing with the misappropriation of indications serving to
designate products that originate in a geographical area. In addition, many countries
have also put in place special systems aimed at providing the necessary transparency
about those geographical indications that deserve special protection because of the
specific, geographically determined qualifications that make certain products unique.
Securing protection for such geographical indications in other countries has, however,
been complicated due to differences in approach as to whether protection is justified
or what kind of protection is appropriate, and due to the difficulty to reconcile these
differences given their historical, economic or commercial context.
International rules for the protection of geographical indications would perhaps
better be designed starting from the premise that a wide diversity in national systems
simply exists. In particular, procedures for the international registration of
geographical indications should recognize this. A flexible interpretation and
application of the Lisbon Agreement provides a possible basis for a solution in this
respect, as does the possible creation of a link between the Lisbon Agreement and the
Madrid Protocol.41
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Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy