The name is absent



only themselves. Also note that foreign workers were highly present in the
sector across countries: see Table 2. If immigrants into this sector also self-
employed themselves, the number of service providers would increase in the
sector, intensifying competition in the output, rather than input, market.
We will check on this line of reasoning later.

Second, we find that, in the hospitality sector (category h), the proba-
bility of preferring immigration restriction is higher for employers than the
others among those who anticipated immigration to reduce the cost of labor.
This is counter intuitive, given the standard argument exemplified by Lord
Layard’s letter to the FT in the introduction. Note that the estimated effect
of employ is also significantly positive in the construction, wholesale/retail
and repairing service sectors (categories f and g) among those who did not
think that immigration would depress wages. Categories f, g, h and p gen-
erally employed more foreign workers than in the other categories, as Table
2 shows. It might be that employers had experienced dissatisfaction with
the quality of migrant labor they employed. Another possibility is that em-
ployers anticipated intensified competition in their output, rather than input,
markets due to immigration.

Third, there is only one sectoral category that gives evidence consistent
with our expectation, i.e., category o that includes sewage and refuse disposal,
sanitation-related activities and recreational, cultural and sports activities.
The estimated effect of employ is significantly negative among those who
thought that immigration would reduce wages.

When discussing the positive effect of employ in the household-activity
sector above, we speculated that the size of an employer in terms of the

30



More intriguing information

1. The name is absent
2. Developing vocational practice in the jewelry sector through the incubation of a new ‘project-object’
3. The name is absent
4. The name is absent
5. Opciones de política económica en el Perú 2011-2015
6. The Demand for Specialty-Crop Insurance: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
7. Legal Minimum Wages and the Wages of Formal and Informal Sector Workers in Costa Rica
8. Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations
9. The name is absent
10. Before and After the Hartz Reforms: The Performance of Active Labour Market Policy in Germany