as a virtue. She notes that while it does not appear on Aristotle’s list, the idea of
trustworthiness as a character virtue is consistent with an Aristotelian account of the
virtues. She notes, with some accuracy, that there is a general agreement (albeit with
caveats) on the moral value of trustworthiness. If trustworthiness is a virtue then it has
been too long neglected and Potter has done philosophy a service in beginning the
discussion. However, one of the difficulties in conceiving of trustworthiness as a virtue
(and possibly a reason that it has not been claimed as a virtue as such previously) is that
it differs from the standard requirements of a virtue insofar as it is particularly
susceptible to situation. It is not merely that different interpretations of trustworthiness
are likely, for this is true of other, accepted, virtues such as courage. Rather it is that the
degree to which someone is considered to be trustworthy will depend upon the
perspectives of those placing (or misplacing) trust. So whereas both friend and foe can
agree on the courageousness of a soldier in battle, in situations of trust involving more
that one other person, conflict is always a possibility and the same action that upholds
the trust of one party may be betrayal for another. This is because in being trustworthy
we choose both an allegiance and a moral stance in relation to others.
Potter claims that being untrustworthy is sometimes the trustworthy thing to do. For
example, in betraying an undertaking not to inform the authorities when an
acquaintance confesses to abusing his child one has made a moral choice between
breaking the trust of an acquaintance rather than that of his child. Whatever one does in
a situation of this kind there will be at least one third party who will perceive one’s act
(or omission) as an act of betrayal, a betrayal of trust; and as such, one becomes, even if
only for a single instance, untrustworthy from that person ,s point of view. This extreme
illustration serves to highlight a tension in the notion of trustworthiness although it
might be said that in the situation as described the trust placed by the acquaintance is
illegitimate and hence cannot be a trust betrayed. Indeed, it might be said that were such
a confidence given to a dispositionally trustworthy person, that person is to be relied
upon to act in a way that is trustworthy from the child’s perspective because they
understand the immorality of child abuse. Maybe so, but the example is meant only to
illustrate a point that might be captured better by a less extreme example. Potter notes
that what she calls ‘mid level’ workers (a category that includes nurses) often find
themselves trusted from a number of different perspectives. So in matters of being
worthy of trust a nurse might find themselves judged by, amongst others, a doctor, a
nurse administrator, the nursing professional body, as well as by a patient or a patient’s
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