by that particular nurse. This is what I take Potter to mean in claiming this first of her
requirements of trustworthiness: giving “.. .signs and assurances of our
trustworthiness" (Potter 2002 p. 27) (original emphasis). It is not that we must ask
people to trust us, for as Baier (1986) reminds us such an injunction means little: others
will either already believe us to be trustworthy, in which case the statement is
redundant, or believe us to be untrustworthy, in which case the words alone will do little
to convince them otherwise. In asking us to make known our trustworthiness Potter
requires a demonstration of this trustworthiness. The signs and assurances she seeks are
those that enable others to see that we have a good will towards them, that when we are
entrusted with the things they value we will care for them in a way that respects and
recognises their value to this particular individual at this particular point in time. It is a
demonstration that we will not exploit their weaknesses or vulnerabilities. It is in deeds
rather than in rhetoric that we prove ourselves to be trustworthy.
U) That we take our epistemic responsibility seriously
Potter takes this to be a requirement for reflection and self-knowledge. To be
trustworthy one needs to know what effect one has on others, how one’s own moral
values and beliefs can be perceived by others and the relationship this has to one’s
trustworthiness from the perspective of those others. It is to engage with the question:
how do I know I am trustworthy? According to Potter, assumptions about one’s own
trustworthiness can be unreliable, particularly in relation to people with different social
or cultural norms. It may come as a surprise for a western male health care worker to
find himself apparently not trusted by, for example, a female Muslim patient. Such a
surprise would only occur if the male health care worker had not taken his epistemic
responsibilities seriously. Self-knowledge in identifying his own assumed
trustworthiness as predicated on a set of social norms that not everyone shares will
make it possible for him to recognise a need to be proactive in demonstrating his
trustworthiness beyond the confines of his own social and cultural norms.
While Potter makes an important point here it is also necessary for a health care worker
to take seriously the epistemic requirements of her or his particular role. That is, in
order to be trustworthy the health care professional must know those things that are
necessary for, at the very least, the competent practice of the particular skill(s) required
of the role. It may be that Potter assumes this requirement for she notes elsewhere that
as patients we need to exercise epistemic trust as well as general trust if we are to trust
122