Potter’s ten requirements for full trustworthiness:
i. “That we give signs and assurances of our trustworthiness."
ii. “That we take epistemic responsibility seriously.”
iii. “That we develop sensitivity to the particularities of others.”
iv. “That we respond properly to broken trust.”
v. “That we deal with hurt in relationships-both the hurt we inflict on others
and the hurt we experience from others-in ways that sustain connection.”
vi. “That our institutions and governing bodies be virtuous.”
vii. “That we recognize the importance of being trustworthy to the
disenfranchised and oppressed.”
viii. “That we are committed to mutuality in intimate as well as civic
relationships.”
ix. “That we work to sustain connection in intimate relationships while neither
privatizing nor endangering mutual flourishing.”
x. “That we need also to have other virtues.”
(Potter 2002 pp. 26-31) (original emphasis)
As Potter notes, the list of requirements presupposes “a genuine regard for the good of
others” (Potter 2002 p. 31). Thus she seems to indicate that the virtue of trustworthiness
requires a positive injunction for good will towards others, rather than merely a lack of
ill will. These conditions are demanding and make full trustworthiness difficult to
achieve but this is something it shares with other character dispositions. To assess the
reasonableness (or otherwise) of Potter’s requirements each of these conditions will be
outlined in turn.
i) That we give signs and assurances of our trustworthiness
As suggested above, it is likely that in attempting to be trustworthy, health care
professionals may find themselves pulled in different directions. That a nurse must
sometimes choose between different trust expectations and therefore betray someone’s
trust seems inevitable. But in choosing whose trust to betray the nurse is demonstrating
an allegiance. This might tell us something about the character of that nurse but a
display of loyalty in one situation cannot be assumed to be symptomatic of a
generalised disposition of trustworthiness towards a particular individual or group.
Nevertheless, it is to be assumed that inferences will be made by those who witness a
betrayal of trust about the likelihood of future trustworthy or untrustworthy behaviour
121