iv) That we properly respond to broken trust
Potter describes a situation in which a health care worker, having given assurances to
the contrary, lies to a client in order to save her life. While recognising that moral theory
and bioethics can provide persuasive reasons justifying a lie in the sorts of
circumstances she describes, there remains a tendency, says Potter, for the matter to be
left there. It is as if, she says, once an otherwise objectionable action is justified there is
nothing more to be said. Potter notes, with some accuracy, that this is often not the end
of the matter for the individual health care worker who delivered the lie (or other
deception) or for the individual client whose trust has been betrayed. It is to this general
neglect of character in bioethics that Potter takes exception. In her example the health
care worker has betrayed the trust of the patient, and has, at least in a single instance,
proved untrustworthy having claimed to be trustworthy. Her objection is that even when
the breaking of a trust is the ‘right thing’ to do it nevertheless leaves those health care
workers who take trustworthiness to be important in their relationships with patients in
an invidious position. For Potter then, a further requirement for someone who is fully
trustworthy (someone, that is, who has the virtue of trustworthiness) is that following a
breach of trust not only will they know and feel that harm has occurred but that they
will attempt to make reparation. The form of this reparation will depend on a number of
factors but will be at a minimum an apology and an explanation with the aim of
recovering trust. However, as noted earlier, trust is fragile and the recovery of a trust
lost is not an easy matter, and while attempts to restore trust might offer something
tangible to the one who broke the trust (for example, the attempt to make reparation,
whether successful or not, might merely serve to ease the conscience of the betrayer of
trust), it may do little for the one who has experienced betrayal.
v) That we deal with hurt in relationships-both the hurt we inflict on others and the hurt
we experience from others-in ways that sustain connection
In this requirement Potter begins to outline her sociological assumptions for she
recognises that hurt in relationships occurs beyond the realms of trust and
trustworthiness. In terms of the hurt we cause, she places emphasis on two points. The
first is that in betraying trust whether intentional or not, we inflict hurt, and
trustworthiness requires us to both notice the hurt caused and attempt to make amends.
The second is the more general point that in noticing the ways in which we cause hurt
(whether or not this is in terms Ofbetraying trust) being trustworthy requires us to set
about cultivating our habits so as to reduce the hurt we inflict. In other words, this is a
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