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Derek Sellman
Limits to open-mindedness.
One problem that arises from this discussion relates
to whether or not there are things about which one
should never be open-minded.
Gardner (1993) maintains that there is a whole
range of issues about which it would be absurd to
remain open-minded. Thus, the Pope cannot be open-
minded about the existence of God and we should not
be open-minded about the wickedness of child abuse.
Hare & McLaughlin (1994) accept that there are
indeed limits to open-mindedness but they do not
believe this to be a fatal flaw. It does, however, cause
some difficulties. They note four such limitations that
might be categorized as: the practical limit; the ratio-
nal limit; the moral limit; and the logical limit.
The practical limit is illustrated by noting that a
defendant in a murder trial who is actually innocent
cannot be open-minded about his innocence (Hare,
1985).
The rational limit is the set of firmly held beliefs,
which it would be bizarre and misleading to claim to
be open-minded about. It would only be in very par-
ticular and unusual (that is поп-everyday) circum-
stances that doubts would even be entertained. By
way of example they suggest that when doing philos-
ophy one might be prepared to be open-minded
about the sorts of things thatl... are so basic and fun-
damental that they must hold if anything is to count
as evidence’ (Hare & McLaughlin, 1994, p. 244).
Hare & McLaughlin are more tentative about the
nature and scope of the moral limit but they do say
‘There may also be beliefs ... of morality which are
so fundamental to our understanding of what moral-
ity is that we cannot make sense of the suggestion that
they may be false’ (Hare & McLaughlin, 1994, p. 242).
The logical limit is set by the terms in which open-
mindedness is understood. Thus it is not possible
to be open-minded about open-mindedness itself
because to attempt to be open-minded about open-
mindedness is to demonstrate a commitment to
open-mindedness.
It is at this point that Bramall (2000) takes issue
with the terms within which the debate is conducted.
Bramall claims that to be open-minded and to accept
the logical limitation is to accept and be committed
to a liberal rational methodology without being open-
minded about that methodology (or even without
recognizing the adherence to a particular methodol-
ogy). The liberal rational account is, Bramall main-
tains, a product of the Enlightenment project and fails
to recognize, or is perhaps unable to recognize,
its own perspective as prejudiced. Drawing upon
hermeneutic phenomenology, Bramall (2000, p. 207)
concludes that:
Our view of the world is . .. always constrained by our con-
ceptual horizons. All understanding is always one interpre-
tation of phenomena that could be interpreted differently
from different categorical and conceptual frameworks.
In arguing for *... something like a virtue of
hermeneutic open-mindedness’ (Bramah, 2000, p.
209) claims that the logical limitation of open-mind-
edness as conceived in the liberal rational tradition
can be overcome. Hermeneutic open-mindedness
allows for ‘... the possibility for individuals to be
open-minded about all their important beliefs includ-
ing the commitment to open-mindedness itself
(Bramah, 2000, p. 211).
The idea of open-mindedness as a virtue is strong
in Bramah’s account. He talks of the ‘dispositionally
antidogmatic’ person, which seems to me to be the
purpose of educating for open-mindedness. Tire chal-
lenge for educators, of course, is to create an envi-
ronment in which open-mindedness can flourish.
Practice
One of my firm beliefs is that nursing is a particular
form of social practice (Sellman, 2000), engagement
with which requires what MacIntyre (1984) describes
as the three core virtues of a practice: the virtues of
courage, truthfulness and justice. Amongst those
additional virtues I claim to be necessary for the prac-
tice of nursing is the virtue of open-mindedness.
'IIiere is an emphasis in nursing, as with other prac-
tical professions, for practice to be based on evidence.
The major assumption behind this is that practice
based on evidence is more likely to be beneficial. A
further assumption is that individual practitioners
have the capacity or willingness to change their prac-
tice in the light of appropriate sorts of evidence. If this
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