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Derek Sellman
limits to those restrictions. Furthermore, restrictions
to autonomy of thought and restrictions to autonomy
of the will are not part of legitimate captivity.
This means that as a prisoner I would expect that
certain autonomous choices remain open to me:
choices in relation to worship, exercise, sleep, having
milk in my coffee and so on are choices that I must
continue to enjoy should I be required to endure any
periods of legitimate captivity, and I expect these
sorts of choices to be available to others held against
their will.
However, my view in particular, that is my view
about the particular conditions in which particular
persons are being held in a particular prison will be a
view that requires me to have access to certain sorts
of information; information that provides evidence
on which I can say whether or not conditions in the
particular case meet my view in general of what is
acceptable in holding persons against their will.
Therefore it remains possible for me to remain open-
minded in the particular without compromizing my
strongly held firm general belief.
It is tempting to think that because I hold a firm
view in general I no longer have an open-mind but
this would be to confuse two aspects of open-
mindedness. These two aspects are central to the
debates between Gardner on the one hand and
Hare & McLaughlin on the other on the nature of
open-mindedness.
From my understanding of this debate I believe the
central issue to be whether or not it is possible to hold
a firm view and at the same time have an open-mind
about that view.This question is posed most forcefully
by Gardner (1993), who asks if it is possible for the
Pope to be open-minded about the existence of God.
This is a rhetorical question for Gardner takes it as
absurd that one can be open-minded about a com-
mitment of this nature. Gardner makes a distinction
that I interpret as a difference between ‘having an
open-mind’ in the particular (which he claims is the
everyday meaning of open-mindedness) and ‘being
open-minded’ in general (which he takes to be incon-
sistent with holding any firm views at all).
Hare & McLaughlin (1994) claim that Gardner’s
position illustrates a common misunderstanding
about the nature of open-mindedness.
William Hare states that: ζ... the open-minded
person is one who is able and willing to form an
opinion, or revise it, in the light of evidence and argu-
ment’ (Hare, 1988, p. 123).
Following this definition I take it that I may be
open-minded in four different sorts of ways.
1 I have insufficient information on which to form a
firm view. This is the position in respect of my view of
whether or not those incarcerated in camp X-ray are
being treated appropriately. I have an open-mind on
this question and remain uncommitted to a particular
view while maintaining my view in general.
2 I have not yet given attention to the matter so I have
no firm view. Here I am unable to hold a firm view as I
have not considered it necessary and unless I can be
convinced of a need to hold a firm view on the matter
I will continue to remain open-minded about it.This is
not to say that 1 have no opinion on the matter, but it
is to say that my opinion is likely to be based on some-
thing other than sufficient evidence or argument.
3 I have given attention to the matter but the infor-
mation is sitch that I cannot arrive at a firm view. Tlris
is similar to position 1 above. In position 1 I remain
of the opinion that sufficient information exists and
that I anticipate access to that information. In posi-
tion 3 I have accessed the available information and
find the evidence to be inconclusive (the jury is still
out, so to speak). It is possible that one day there will
be additional and perhaps compelling evidence to
enable me to come to a firm view.
4 I have given attention to the matter and the infor-
mation is such that I can come to a firm view, but at
the same time I accept that there may be a need to
return to 3 above from time to time in the light of new
information. Here I have come to hold a firm view
based on evidence and/or argument, that is to say I
am committed to a firm view. For example, if I firmly
believe, based on what I perceive to be a set of con-
vincing arguments, that prisoners should be treated in
the way outlined earlier, I will also be committed to
the possibility that this firm belief might be wrong. I
therefore remain committed to the possibility that, at
some future time, I might be presented with an argu-
ment or with some evidence that would convince me
that I am (was) wrong to hold this particular belief.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 Nursing Philosophy, 4. pp. 17-24
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