Open-mindedness: a virtue for professional practice
Derek Sellman RMN RGN BSc(Hons) MA
Senior Lecturer. University of the West Of England, Faculty of Health & Social Care, Genside Campus, Hlackberry Hill, Bnstoi BS і 6 ɪ DD, UK
Original Article
Abstract This paper introduces the notion of open-mindedness before proceed-
ing to outline its value to the practical activity of nursing. An argument
is constructed to point to the desirability of the development of a virtue
of open-mindedness in nurses in order to complement evidence-based
practice. Attention is drawn to two failures of open-mindedness (the
vices of closed-mindedness and credulousness), which have the poten-
tial both to restrict autonomous practice and to cause harm.
Keywords: open-mindedness, virtues, practical wisdom.
Open-mindedness: a virtue for
professional practice
When I say I have an open mind about something I
take it to mean that I have not yet come to a firm view
about that particular thing. Indeed it would be
unusual for me to say that I have an open mind in this
way unless there was some reason that I believe it
important for me to have a view on that particular
matter. For example, I might think it important that I
take a view on the conditions under which prisoners
are being held in camp X-ray at Guantanamo Bay.
While I may have a firm view about what sort of con-
ditions should be in place in general for those held
Correspondence: Derek Sellman, University of the West Of
England, Faculty of Health & Social Care, Glenside Campus,
Blackberry Hill, Bristol BS16 1DD, UK. Tel.: Ol 17 3448771; fax:
0117 3448408: e-mail: [email protected]
against their will I can at the same time remain open-
minded about whether or not the conditions in which
those currently held in camp X-ray are being kept are
acceptable. Thus I may be committed to a view in
general but not necessarily committed to a view in
particular, at least in this example.
For the purpose of illustration I might say that my
view in general is that persons in captivity should not
have their autonomy overridden beyond that which
is a necessary component of a prison sentence. Ibus
while the individual may be locked in a prison cell
their movements within that cell should not be
restricted beyond ensuring their own safety and the
safety of others. To tie a prisoner to the bed in her or
his cell is to exceed the legitimate restrictions on her
or his autonomy of action. Or to put this another
way, while there are legitimate restrictions on the
autonomy of action of prisoners (that is, after all, what
it means to be a prisoner) there are nevertheless
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 Nursing Philosophy, 4. pp. 17-24
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