The name is absent



Heterogeneous Employees and Excess Supply of Ordinary Employees (scratch)

Now we introduce heterogeneity of laborers and more labor market competition into
our model. We assume that the economy has two firms and need total 4 employees: all
the employees’ ex-post capabilities are different (but they are the same ex-ante): two
are good, two are bad. and two are in the middle: and the two bad ones are of no use.
Moreover, again we assume that there is no product competition (e.g. all products have
demand).

We denote the rwo firms by mɪ and mɔ: the three employees in each firm by Ец , £12, E13
and K21,£32,-^23: and the two customers in each firm by Cn,C12 and C21,C⅛2∙ Each
firm can serve only two customers, so that there is no competition between firms in the
product market. Customers are identical and firm have identical assets. That is. for any
of the four employees we have
V1(ki) — V⅛(⅛i). To simplify the model, we assume that
ownership is determined ex-ante and there is no trade of ownership titles ex-post.

Emplovee E-lj has a oυ probability of being a good employee and α⅛ = ɪ- Ex-post,
among all employees there are two good ones with values of vɪ and
v2 (i.e. v0 = v1r υ2;
and uɪ > v2) respectively each with the same probability' of ⅛∙: moreover, there are four
ordinary ones with values of υ3 =
v4 = υm > υ5 = υ6 = υb respectively with the same
probability of —ɪ : and denote them as middles ones
(vm) and bad ones (vb). Formally,
by investing in human capital employee
Eτj gets an ex-post value of

Atlog(l ÷ ktj),
A9log(l÷ko∙).


with probability 1 — ɑŋ
with probability ɑŋ. ’

where A9 > 1 and g = 1.2: and λt < 1. and t = m,b: moreover. Am > λ6. Ex-ante
it is not known how each employee
Ег] is ranked. Here, we assume that the value
of the firm’s product is the highest as long as there is a good employee and a middle
employee, i.e.. V (fc9,
km. kb) = V (k91 fc9, km) = V (W. km. km) = V (υg (W), υm (km)) =
V > V3 + Vm.
where. V = f (v, (fc*). υm (fcm)) and f",ti,. (fc«, km) ≡ β⅛⅞f"' = O.9
Moreover.
V (kkm,kb) ≡Vx > V (k2.km.fc6) ≡ V2. that implies that there will be a
competition for
E1.

From the above set up. it is obvious that at equilibrium, each of the two firms in the
economy will have one good, one middle, and one bad employee.

9The technical assumption (fe*. A:"1) = 0 is macle to keep the model simple. It is not critical
for our results.

26



More intriguing information

1. Knowledge and Learning in Complex Urban Renewal Projects; Towards a Process Design
2. An alternative way to model merit good arguments
3. Permanent and Transitory Policy Shocks in an Empirical Macro Model with Asymmetric Information
4. CREDIT SCORING, LOAN PRICING, AND FARM BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
5. Dual Inflation Under the Currency Board: The Challenges of Bulgarian EU Accession
6. The name is absent
7. The name is absent
8. Delivering job search services in rural labour markets: the role of ICT
9. Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 11
10. The name is absent
11. A Hybrid Neural Network and Virtual Reality System for Spatial Language Processing
12. Using Surveys Effectively: What are Impact Surveys?
13. The Tangible Contribution of R&D Spending Foreign-Owned Plants to a Host Region: a Plant Level Study of the Irish Manufacturing Sector (1980-1996)
14. The name is absent
15. The Modified- Classroom ObservationScheduletoMeasureIntenticnaCommunication( M-COSMIC): EvaluationofReliabilityandValidity
16. The name is absent
17. Group cooperation, inclusion and disaffected pupils: some responses to informal learning in the music classroom
18. The name is absent
19. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SOCIAL WELFARE EFFECTS OF NEW AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY
20. Effects of a Sport Education Intervention on Students’ Motivational Responses in Physical Education