GDAE Working Paper No. 09-01 Resources, Rules and International Political Economy
35It was in response to the perceived inadequacy of TRIMS and the failure to launch new investment
negotiations at the Singapore Ministerial that many came to regard the OECD as a more appropriate forum,
and negotiations soon began in that forum on a “Multilateral Agreement on Investment” (MAI).
36Note that in 1997 India (and later, in 2002, a handful of other developing countries) did propose also
regulating the behaviour of firms and TNCs’ home governments, but these proposals had little traction and
were not taken seriously.
37Elizabeth Smyth, “Just Say No! The Negotiation of Investment Rules at the WTO,” International
Journal of Political Economy 33 (Winter 2003): 70, table 1.
38Ibid.
39For another analysis of developing countries’ blocking power in the area of international investment
negotiations, see Eduardo Plastino, “Investments and the WTO,” Msc Dissertation, Development Studies
Institute, London School of Economics, 2008. On file with author.
40As I have argued elsewhere, bad rules may be better than no rules - but they are still bad rules! See
Shadlen, “Patents and Pills, Power and Procedure”; “Intellectual Property, Trade, and Development: Can
Foes be Friends?” Global Governance 13 (June 2007): 171-178.
41Richard Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in
the GATT/WTO,” International Organization 56 (2002): 339-374.
42Ibid.
43 Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power?”: 360
44Gruber, Ruling the World.
45Krasner, Structural Conflict.
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