GDAE Working Paper No. 09-01 Resources, Rules and International Political Economy
Endnotes
1I use the quotation marks to qualify the verb. As we shall see, in both instances developing countries
blocked outcomes that they regarded as worse than the status quo, so they “prevailed” by securing the
better (less worse) of two outcomes. Yet most developing countries also oppose the status quo, and they
have not been able to replace it by achieving agreements on international rules that are more aligned to
their preferences. Hence the need to qualify the word “prevail.” I address these issues throughout the
chapter.
2See, for example, Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, “International Trade Institutions and the
North-South Dialogue,” International Journal 36 (Autumn 1981): 732-765; Stephen D. Krasner, Structural
Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1985); David A. Lake, “Power and the Third World: Toward a Realist Political Economy of North-
South Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 31 (June 1987): 217-234; John Gerard Ruggie, “Political
Structure and Change in the International Economic Order: The North-South Dimension,” in J.G. Ruggie,
ed., The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1983): 423-487; Kenneth C. Shadlen, “Patents and Pills, Power and
Procedure: The North-South Politics of Public Health in the WTO,” Studies in Comparative International
Development 39 (Autumn 204): 76-108. Diana Tussie, The Less Developed Countries and the World
Trading System: A Challenge to the GATT (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987); Robert H. Wade, “The
Ringmaster of Doha,” New Left Review. 25 (January-February 2004): 146-152.
3Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Kenneth A.
Oye, ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Arthur A. Stein, Why
Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993). For a more recent reviews of this body of literature, see Vinod K. Aggarwal and Cédric Dupont,
“Collaboration and Co-Ordination in the Global Political Economy,” in John Ravenhill, ed., Global
Political Economy, Second Edition (Oxford University Press, 2007); Lloyd Gruber Ruling the World:
Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton University Press, 2000); Lisa L.
Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International
Organization 52 (Autumn 1998): 729-757.
4Krasner, International Regimes. See also, Aggarwal and DuPont, “Collaboration and Co-Ordination”;
Beth Simmons and Stephan Haggard, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41
(Summer 1987): 491-518; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
5Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28 (April
1976): 317-347; Charles Kindelberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973).
6Keohane, After Hegemony; Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy; Lisa L. Martin, “The Political
Economy of International Cooperation,” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, ed., Global
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 51-64.
7Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue-linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 32 (April
1980): 357-405; Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International
Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). See also the special issue of International
Organization 46 (Winter 1992), dedicated to the theme “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy
Coordination.”
8Nancy Birdsall and Robert Z. Lawrence, “Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Good for
Developing Countries?” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, ed., Global Public Goods:
International Cooperation in the 21st Century (Oxford University Press, 1999): 128-151; Stephan Haggard,
Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration (Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution,
1995); Kenneth C. Shadlen, “Exchanging Development for Market Access? Deep Integration and Industrial
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