(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Table 1A: Example of strategy coding
Period |
ID |
choice |
opponent |
Reactive strategies |
opponent (**) |
Global strategies |
opponent's |
Targeted strategies | ||||||
Grim |
TfT |
TfT |
Grim |
TfT |
TfT |
Grim |
TfT |
TfT | ||||||
1 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
6 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
8 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
17 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
7 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
24 |
7 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Notes: (*) 1=cooperation, 0=defection, (**) 1=3 persons cooperated, 0=less than 3 persons cooperated;
TfT=tit-for-tat regressor. Experimental data from session 8, cycle 1, periods 1-25 (non-anonymous public
monitoring treatment).
45