Agricultural Policy as a Social Engineering Tool

(www.clas.berkeley.edu). Thompson (2005) notes that agricultural interest groups have
effectively managed to direct their campaign contributions to influence legislation of
interest to them despite the shrinking size of the U.S. agricultural sector and its work
force relative to the U.S. economy and population. This observation has empirical
support in recent work. Tavernier (2005) finds that farm operators who belong to the
American Farm Bureau do not want food products made with biotechnology labeled even
if there is a scientifically determined difference in the product. This position has made it
increasingly difficult to pass meaningful legislation regarding the labeling of GM foods
in the U.S.

Clearly the motivation and reasons for the social engineering efforts in agriculture
are diverse. These reasons are political, economic and cultural and often consider the
strategic role that food and fiber play in all societies. For example, while significant
changes have been made to the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European
Union (EU), the CAP remains an important mechanism through which member
governments defend national agricultural policies within a highly protectionist
institutional structure. This structure encourages a social policy that strives for the
achievement of “social parity for those who work in agriculture.” To achieve that parity,
policy instruments such as variable import levies, export subsidies in the form of export
refunds, and other interventionist policies are often used. These policies greatly distort
international trade. In the case of EU sugar, for example, 5 million tons are dumped on
the world market every year, supporting the international price while the European price
remains at a guaranteed high.

www.europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/public/capleaflet/cap en.htm

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