On Dictatorship, Economic Development and Stability *
Lionel Artige
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
September 6, 2004
Abstract
This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political
stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are
the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes’ stability. Societies with low
natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in
exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why pop-
ulations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a
relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low
* I have greatly benefitted from comments of David de la Croix, Philippe Michel, as well as of Klaus
Desmet, Philippe Monfort, Henri Snessens, participants of the 2003 Public Choice Annual Meeting in
Nashville and participants of the Macroeconomic seminar at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
Responsibility for all errors is my own. Address for correspondance: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona,
Edifici B, Campus de la UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain. Email: [email protected]
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